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The United States Supreme Court in recent years has taken an increased interest in patent 
law, making a number of key decisions in the areas of injunctions1, licensing2, patentable subject 
matter3, and the standards of determining obviousness.4  In the current 2007-2008 term, the 
Court has already granted certiorari to consider the boundaries of the patent exhaustion doctrine; 
a case closely watched by legal commentators and observers.5  The Court's attention has also 
 
 
1 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 
2 MedImmune v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007). 
 
3 LabCorp v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006). 
 
4 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).   
 
5 Court Agrees To Consider Patent Case On Royalties, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at C2; Supreme Court to Decide 
Patent Exhaustion Case, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/09/supreme-court-t.html (September 25, 2007) 
(reporting on the Supreme Court’s decision to review the United States Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 28 (2007)).  In another case with antitrust and 
intellectual property implications, the Supreme Court declined to grant the petitioner’s writ of certiorari to consider 
another issue of patent exhaustion in McFarling v. Monsanto, Co., 128 S. Ct. 871 (2008).   
been drawn to the intersection of intellectual property law and antitrust law, with two cases in 
that legal realm having been recently decided.  In Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, the 
Court considered whether the presumption that patent owners have market power in the subject 
matter of their patents is “applicable in the antitrust context when a seller conditions its sale of a 
patented product . . . on the purchase of a second product.”6   
In another decision involving antitrust law and having intellectual property ramifications, 
the Supreme Court held in Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS (hereinafter “Leegin”) that 
the legality of vertical price restraints7 were to be determined under a rule of reason standard, 
thereby overturning long-standing precedents.8  For nearly a century, the jurisprudence regarding 
minimum vertical price restraints had been resoundingly in favor of a per se rule against the 
practice.  Since the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case of Dr. Miles Medical Company v. John 
D. Park & Sons Company (hereinafter “Dr. Miles”), vertical minimum price fixing arrangements 
were held to be a per se violation of antitrust laws.9   
This paper will explore the Leegin decision by discussing the history of vertical price 
restraints and will suggest what practical affect, if any, the Court’s holding may have on the 
                                                 
 
6 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006).  In Independent Ink, the appellants sold and licensed patented inkjet technology to 
manufacturers under an agreement that the manufacturers and its customers would exclusively buy replacement ink 
from them, and not from any other source.  Id. at 31-32.  The respondents in that case countered allegations of 
infringement by alleging that the appellant’s licensing scheme amounted to an illegal tying and monopoly 
arrangement.  Id. at 32.  As noted in Justice Stevens’ opinion in the case, Congress “amend[ed] the Patent Act to 
eliminate the market power presumption in patent misuse cases,” leaving the issue of whether the same presumption 
remains as a matter of antitrust jurisprudence.  Id. at 31.  Ultimately, the Court concluded that “the mere fact that a 
tying product is patented does not support such a presumption [of market power].”  Id.  
 
7 Other synonyms for the practice include vertical price fixing and vertical price maintenance.  I will use the terms 
interchangeably throughout this paper, but will remain consistent to the term used by the original in any cited 
materials where appropriate. 
 
8 Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2007).   
 
9 220 U.S. 373 (1911).  The Court held that “agreements . . . between dealers, having for their sole purpose the 
destruction of competition and the fixing [of] prices, are injurious to the public interest and void.  They are not saved 
by the advantages which the participants expect to derive from the enhanced price to the consumer.”  Id. at 384-85. 
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future of antitrust law.  Part I will begin by defining and discussing what vertical price restraints 
are, as well as the arguments advanced by both proponents and opponents of such pricing 
arrangements.  Part II will further discuss the prior judicial standard as announced by the Dr. 
Miles decision and the subsequent gradual chipping away of that standard by court decisions in 
the decades that followed that holding.  Part III will discuss the Leegin decision itself, and will 
attempt to forecast the potential future impact the decision will have on suits alleging uses of 




A.  Vertical Price Fixing – What is it? 
 
 As noted by Professor Glen Robinson, vertical price fixing is one of the most 
controversial subjects in the field of antitrust law.10  Legal practitioners and academics have long 
debated whether such practices should be encouraged as a means of supporting competition, or 
prohibited as an unlawful restraint on fair trade.11  Price fixing in general occurs where there is 
“an agreement among competitors to raise, fix, or otherwise maintain the price at which their 
goods or services are sold.”12  Thus, “any agreement that restricts price competition,” regardless 
of whether the parties involved “agree to charge exactly the same price,” may justify a finding of 
                                                 
 
10 Glen Robinson, Explaining Vertical Agreements: The Colgate Puzzle and Antitrust Method, 80 VA. L. REV. 577, 
577 (1994).   
 
11 Id.   
 
12 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PRICE FIXING, BID RIGGING, AND MARKET ALLOCATION SCHEMES: 
WHAT THEY ARE AND WHAT TO LOOK FOR (2005), http://justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/211578.htm [hereinafter 
DOJ, PRICE FIXING].  Alternatively, the practice has also been defined as “agreements in which an upstream seller 
agrees with a buyer on the minimum price, or the exact price, at which the buyer will resell the goods.”  Id.  See also 
Brief for Economists as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 
S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 173681, at *1.   
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liability for violating antitrust laws.13  Vertical price fixing occurs most commonly with 
“restraints imposed by the seller on the buyer (or vice versa),” or any restraint on prices 
occurring among parties in a vertical relationship with each other.14   
 Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, a wide variety of anticompetitive behavior was 
outlawed in the wake of growing public discontent over the power held by trusts such as John 
Rockefeller’s Standard Oil.15  In its current form, § 1 of the Act makes “[e]very contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations . . . illegal.”16  Initially after the passage of the 
Sherman Act, the Supreme Court applied the language literally as barring every contract or 
conspiracy “in restraint of trade.”17   Later cases took into account “social and economic 
realit[ies]” as well as legislative intent, and consequently the Court adjusted its interpretation to 
hold that “§1 outlaws only unreasonable restraints” of trade.18 
                                                 
 
13 DOJ, PRICE FIXING, supra note 12, at 2.  The Dept. of Justice also noted that other examples of price fixing 
behavior include “establish[ing] or adher[ing] to price discounts … [h]old[ing] prices firm … [a]dopt[ing] a standard 
formula for computing prices … [and adhering] to a minimum fee or price schedule.”  Id.   
 
14 ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 286 (4th ed. 1994) 
(noting the example of a car manufacturer, who produces cars for sale to dealers, who in turn sell the cars to 
individual consumers at retail as parties in a vertical relationship).   
 
15 Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Retrospective and Prospective:  Where Are We Coming From? Where 
Are We Going?, in REVITALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY 4-5 (Harry First et al. eds., 1991). 
 
16 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
 
17 John J. Flynn & James F. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints: The 
Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the Resolution of Antitrust Disputes, in REVITALIZING ANTITRUST 
IN ITS SECOND CENTURY 272 (Harry First et al. eds., 1991). 
 
18 Id.; Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712 (citing State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)).  In Board of Trade of the City of 
Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), the Supreme Court rejected an invitation to literally apply the 
Sherman Act to all contracts, noting that every “agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains… 
[and to] bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.”  Instead as the Leegin Court noted, “the Court has never “taken a 
literal approach to [section one’s] language.”  127 S. Ct. at 2712 (citing Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 
(2006)). 
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 Consequently, because agreements between manufacturers and their distributors as to the 
price of their goods restrain the ability of the market to freely determine the trade for those 
goods, vertical price restraints trigger antitrust analysis.19  The key inquiry is whether such 
restraints are to be determined under the rule of reason standard or the per se standard under 
Sherman Act case law.  By virtue of the fact that some “restraints are presumed to always have 
an anticompetitive effect,” such restraints are categorized as per se offenses.20  Per se rules are 
often preferred by the courts as a matter of jurisprudential convenience, as they seek to address 
actions that “always or almost always tend[s] to restrict competition and decrease output.”21  
Thus, as soon as conduct is characterized as falling within the bounds prohibited by the per se 
rule, it is condemned without regard for any potential countervailing positive effects.22 
Despite the clear judicial efficiency advantages provided by a bright line per se rule, the 
rule of reason is favored as the governing standard in determining antitrust liability.23  In 
Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics, the Supreme Court noted that “there is a presumption 
in favor of a rule of reason standard . . . [as] departure from that standard must be justified by 
demonstrable economic effect . . . rather than formalistic distinctions.”24  Under a rule of reason 
analysis, courts are required to make “an ascertainment of the facts peculiar to the particular 
                                                 
 
19 Julian von Kalinowski, Peter Sullivan, and Maureen McGuirl, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION, § 2.02 
(2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter ANTITRUST LAWS]. 
 
20 Id. (emphasis added).   
 
21 ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 19, at § 2.02[2] (citing Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 
1, 19-20 (1979)). 
 
22 Id.  See also Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2713 (noting that the “per se rule, treating categories of restraints as necessarily 
illegal, eliminates the need to study the reasonableness of the individual restraint in light of the real market forces at 
work… and [provides] clear guidance for certain conduct”).   
 
23 See Bus. Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988).   
 
24 Id.   
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business” when determining whether a particular practice violates antitrust laws.25  Later cases 
further shaped this rule, noting that the legality of any restraint of trade may be ascertained by 
considering “the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition 
before and after the restraint was imposed; [and] the nature of the restraint and its effect.”26  
Over the last 30 years, there has been a clear shift toward rejecting prior rigid per se standards in 
favor of a more flexible rule of reason analysis as the default standard in judging the legality of 
alleged Sherman Act violations.27  As discussed in greater detail below, the Supreme Court in 
Leegin overturned nearly one hundred years of per se treatment of vertical price restraints in 
favor of a rule of reason approach.28 
                                                
Nonetheless, despite historical underpinnings favoring either a per se, or a rule of reason 
standard, other commentators have argued for yet a third standard in dealing with this issue. 29 
Professors Flynn and Ponsoldt propose employing a rebuttable presumption of illegality in 
determining the validity of a vertical price restraint.30  Under this third standard, courts would 
start with the presumption that vertical price restraints are anti-competitive, but may then 
consider relevant facts that may weigh against finding an antitrust violation. 31  As a result, 
judges would be given a measure of discretion in determining whether there is a true antitrust 
 
 
25 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963). 
 
26 Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, 246 U.S. at 238.    
 
27 See infra notes 199-242 and accompanying text. 
 
28 127 S. Ct. at 2710.   
 
29 See Flynn & Ponsoldt, supra note 17, at 288 (arguing that courts should be allowed a certain level of discretion, 
such that a standard involving a rebuttable presumption would allow for efficient judicial application, while at the 
same time providing some leeway to take into account justifiable reasons for the price restrictions).  
 
30 Id. (emphasis added). 
 
31 Id.   
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violation; discretion similar to that employed in the rule of reason.32  The professors further 
argue that “per se rules should be considered evidentiary presumptions, of varying levels of 
rebuttability, for determining whether there has been an unreasonable displacement of the 
competitive process.”33  In their view, the rule of reason “should be used only where no 
presumption of illegality would apply.”34  While the Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin gives 
credence to Flynn and Ponsoldt’s argument by noting the importance of allowing courts some 
leeway to account for the particular circumstances surrounding the vertical price restraint, the 
Court does not go so far as to adopt the use of evidentiary presumptions.35 
In yet a fourth proposed treatment for dealing with this issue, Professor Richard Posner 
argues that vertical price restraints should be governed under a “rule of per se legality.”36  While 
this proposed standard has not yet been adopted by the courts, commentators have noted that the 
use of a rule of reason in cases of “non-price vertical restraints has nearly amounted to a rule of 
per se legality for such conduct.”37  In doing so, legal scholars suggest that such vertical 
                                                 
 




34 Id.  See also Pamela Jones Harbour, A Tale of Two Marks, and Other Antitrust Concerns, 20 LOY. CONSUMER L. 
REV. 32, 46 (2007) (acknowledging “that it makes sense to have a modified per se rule … to allow a respondent to 
rebut the presumption of illegality” by proffering evidence of a pro-competitive reason for the price restraint).   
 
35 See infra notes 278-281 and accompanying text. 
 
36 Richard Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 6 (1981) (emphasis added).  See also generally Robert Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 
SUP. CT. REV. 171, 190-92 (1977); GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 14, at 318. 
 
37 GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 14, at 418.  See also Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto 
Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 67 (1991).  Ginsburg’s article notes that in light of the 
Continental T.V. decision (see infra, note 47) which adopted the rule of reason to vertical non price restraints, parties 
accused of antitrust law violations who do not exhibit monopolistic behavior were likely to have their activities 
allowed by the courts.  Id. at 67.  Furthermore, Ginsburg explicitly comments that the Court did not go as far as “to 
declare all vertical restraints, both price and nonprice, per se lawful,” thereby adopting the per se legality standard 
proposed by Posner.  Id. at 68.  He writes that the practical effect of the Continental T.V. decision is an uneven 
balancing of the various factors underlying the validity of a particular vertical restraint, as evidenced by an often 
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restraints are presumed to “increase [economic] efficiency and should be permitted except in 
extraordinary circumstances.”38   
Even within the general categorical division of vertical price restraints, case law has 
delineated different jurisprudential standards depending on whether the restraint was one setting 
a maximum price ceiling, or one setting a minimum price floor.39  While for the time being, the 
Leegin decision creates consistency as to the standard to be applied in all cases of vertical price 
restraints, the fluid nature of antitrust law leads to the question of whether the rule of reason will 
remain the governing standard.40    
 
 
B.  Reasons in Favor of and Against Vertical Price Maintenance Schemes 
 
 In many respects, the use of a vertical price restraint is counterintuitive to the main goal 
of most major retail manufacturers, which is to maximize profits.  As explained by Professor 
Posner, the price difference between what “the manufacturer sells [the product] to the dealer and 
the dealer’s price to the consumer is the manufacturer’s cost of distribution.”41  Thus, in order to 
                                                                                                                                                             
threshold analysis and inquiry as to particular key factors.  Id.  As his case study indicated, Ginsburg argues that the 
ease which parties accused of illegal vertical restraints may come up with a justifiable pro-competitive reason for the 
restraint indicates the difficulties in differentiating between a rule of reason and a per se rule of legality.  Id. at 76.   
 
38 GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 14, at 318. 
 
39 See ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 19, at § 18.02.  The Supreme Court had previously announced that vertical 
maximum price fixing was a per se violation of antitrust laws in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).  
There, the court noted that “agreements to fix maximum prices ‘no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the 
freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment.’”  Id. at 152 
(citing Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951)).  Nearly thirty years later, the Court 
reversed itself in State Oil Co. v. Khan and instead held that it was “difficult to maintain that vertically-imposed 
maximum prices could harm consumers or competition to the extent necessary to justify their per se invalidation.”  
Khan, 522 U.S. at 15.   
 
40 See infra notes 199-242 and accompanying text detailing the shift from the long accepted per se treatment of 





maximize profits, “any seller . . . wants to minimize that cost.”42  Restrictions by the 
manufacturer as to the minimum allowable price floor or a maximum price ceiling that the 
product may be sold would logically eat into the profit margin the manufacturer seeks to exploit.  
Yet despite the seemingly illogical rationale for such price restraints by manufacturers,43 the 
practice has remained readily in use.44 
Commentators have argued that by its nature, vertical price fixing is not necessarily 
anticompetitive.45  In support of this argument, they argue that “a manufacturer could improve 
its competitive position in the market and enhance interbrand competition by controlling resa
prices” where the manufacturer is not vertically integrated.
le 
                                                                                                                                                            
46  The enhancement of interbrand 
competition is particularly important in light of recent Supreme Court decisions anointing 
interbrand competition as the “primary concern of antitrust law.47  Professor Robert Bork further 
advocates the use of vertical price restraints, noting in an influential article that “manufacturers 
 
41 RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 171 (U. of Chicago Press, 2d ed. 2001) (hereinafter POSNER, ANTITRUST 
LAW). 
 
42 Id.  (further explaining that “since a higher retail price reduces demand for the manufacturer’s good, and hence his 
sales revenues, one might expect the manufacturer always to encourage rather than restrict competition among his 
dealers in order to minimize the retail price of his product”). 
 
43 To clarify this seemingly specious argument, consider Professor Robert Bork’s explanation that vertical price 
restraints “causes output to expand and the higher [resulting] margins promote enhanced consumer welfare and 
efficiency.”  Mark D. Bauer, Whither Dr. Miles?, 20 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 15 (2007) (citing ROBERT BORK, 
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 296 (Free Press 1978)).  Bork assumes that businesses will reinvest the increased revenue 
caused by vertical price restraints in a manner benefiting the consumer, such as improved “décor and ambience of 
the retail establishment” where its products are sold.  See id.  Commentators argue that Bork’s theory is flawed in 
believing that all customers are drawn to stores based on ambience, as opposed to prices.  Id. at 16 n.82.   
 
44 Recent cases involving vertical price fixing arrangements include: Lotus Bus. Group v. Flying J Inc., 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 86931 (E.D. Wis. November 27, 2007) (where plaintiffs alleged that a minimum markup statute on 
resale prices was a violation of antitrust laws); Arista Records, L.L.C. v. Lime Group, L.L.C., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
88449 (S.D.N.Y. December 3, 2007) (where defendants argued that the plaintiff’s music distribution system 
amounted to an anticompetitive monopoly on internet music services).   
 
45 ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 19, at § 18.01[3].   
 
46 Id.   
 
47 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).       
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will adopt vertical restraints only if profits are increased,” thereby supporting the inference that 
such price fixing schemes are “necessarily procompetitive.”48  Since its writing, Bork’s 
argument has become “the conventional economic wisdom on the efficiency [and therefore 
competition based] implications of vertical restraints.”49 
                                                
 Among the most commonly espoused reasons for a vertical price restraint scheme is what 
is known as the ‘dealer-service theory of resale price maintenance.’50  Under this reasoning, 
vertical price restraints are put in place to increase non-price competition among retail dealers by 
the manufacturer.51  For example, in order to motive dealers to “maintain a large well stocked 
showroom, [deploy] a highly trained and motivated sales force, [advertise] the product 
extensively, or [provide] other costly presale services,” a manufacturer may seek to impose a 
minimum price restraint.52  This may be the result of a manufacturer deciding that the product is 
best sold by means of a particular combination of prices and services.53  In doing so, the 
manufacturer hopes to ensure that customers will not take advantage of those dealers who take 
the initiative to provide extra services.54  In other words, proponents of vertical price restraints 
 
 
48 WILLIAM S. COMANOR, Economics of Vertical Arrangements in REVITALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND 
CENTURY 314 (Harry First et al. eds. 1991) (citing Robert Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price 
Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 375, 398 (1966)).   
 
49 Id.   
 
50 See POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 41, at 172-76.   See cf. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
POLICY – THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 241 (2d ed. West Group 1999) (arguing that in the context 
of intellectual property rights, the problem of a “free rider” is particularly significant, and, as “intellectual property 
rights can easily be appropriated if they are not given greater legal protection,” there is a danger that innovation may 
be stymied if licensing of intellectual property rights is not granted to competitors) 
 
51 See POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 41, at 172. 
 
52 Id. at 172-73. 
 
53 Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 
71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1492 (1983). 
 
54 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW supra note 41, at 173. 
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argue that such pricing schemes are necessary to prevent the situation of customers availing 
themselves of the presale services offered by the first dealer, only to then turn around and buy 
“the same product [from] a no-frills discount operation” run by a competing dealer.55  In its brief 
to the Supreme Court, Leegin argued that creating dealer incentives “to provide service and 
promote the manufacturer’s product . . . [also] fosters interbrand competition” since it allows 
“the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products . . . to 
compete more effectively against other manufacturers.”56 
Critics of this position argue that the existence of “no frills” dealers is something that 
should be encouraged as being at the “very heart of a free market competitive system.”57  Such 
dealers, in the absence of any price restraints, take advantage of their low overhead costs to pass 
those savings on to consumers in the form of lowered prices.58  Professor Robert Pitofsky argues 
that vertical price restraints would thus unduly prevent no frills dealers from passing on those 
savings and would be a disservice to consumers and the competitive free market process.59  He 
further contends that the notion that manufacturers employ vertical price restraints in order to 
encourage dealers to provide extra services is unfounded, since there is no guarantee that such 
                                                 
 
55 Pitofsky, supra note 53, at 1492.  As noted in the District Court’s decision in Leegin, resale price maintenance 
may promote competition by assuring “to the full-service retailer that it will be compensated for providing services 
at the point of sale and promoting the product by a guaranteed margin on the actual sale of the product itself.”  
PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30414, *2 n.2 (E.D. Tex. March 26, 
2004).  Thus, “such assurance[s] incents the full-service retailer to continue to promote the product.”  Id.   
 
56 Brief for Petitioner, Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 127 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 06-480) (January 22, 
2007), 2007 WL 160780, *15 (citing Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 54-55).  
 




59 Id.  This argument is echoed by Professors Gellhorn and Kovacic, who argue that the retail price maintenance may 
act to unfairly “deny customers a broader desired array of price-quality options, including the option of buying the 
product at a lower price through foregoing service or advertising.”  GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 14, at 297.  
They note the example of a consumer who is well versed in the product, who would consider “presentations by a 
knowledgeable sales staff” and other “point of sale services as superfluous.”  Id. at 297-98.   
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price restraints will adequately inform dealers of “exactly what kind and what amount of 
service[s] the manufacturer has in mind.”60  Pitofsky thus asserts that the market, and not 
manufacturers via vertical price restraints, should be the primary means of determining the right 
mix of prices and services available to consumers.61  In doing so, the basic principles of a free 
flowing, competitive market may be best realized.62   
 Professor Posner also criticizes the dealer services theory as flawed, since the only 
situation where a competing dealer would be allowed to “free ride” on the services of another 
dealer is where both retailers are selling essentially identical products.63  Where the retailer’s 
products do not have “the complete identity of the competing products’ characteristics,” then the 
manufacturer’s rationale for imposing resale restraints is consequently lost.64  Other critics argue 
that the procompetitive effects of preventing free riding retailers is “merely theoretical,” with the 
“anticompetitive effects . . . more pernicious than vertical price fixing proponents indicate.”65  
This conclusion was also reached by the Federal Trade Commission in a study which found 
“little evidence that [vertical price restraints were] imposed to prevent free-riding on product-
specific dealer services.”66   
                                                 
 
60 Pitofsky, supra note 53, at 1493 (pointing out the situation of a dealer acting as a “multiproduct outlet” with 
“hundreds or even thousands of items” available for sale as an unrealistic situation where vertical price restraints 






63 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 41, at 174. 
 
64 Id.    
 
65 Dennis O. Doherty, Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.: Monsanto’s Progeny and the 
Congressional Proposal to Codify the Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 963, 992 
(1989).  See also Harbour, supra note 34, at 44-45 (noting skepticism of the free-riding problem as a genuine 
problem solvable with vertical price restraints).   
 
66 COMANOR, supra note 48, at 308 n.18. 
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Proponents of vertical price restraints have also proposed other justifications for the 
practice, including that it allows for the maintenance of a uniform product image.67  The same 
FTC study that found little empirical evidence supporting the free-rider theory concluded that 
“vertical restraints were being used to protect the signal of high quality created by the retailers’ 
general method of doing business.”68  Thus, the use of vertical price restraints may allow 
manufacturers to ensure an excellent product reputation.69  Similarly, vertical price restraints 
have also been argued to help facilitate national advertising campaigns.70 As noted by the 
Supreme Court, “established manufacturers can use [vertical restraints] to induce retailers to 
engage in promotional activities which provide service and repair facilities necessary to the 
efficient marketing of their products.”71  Commentators have argued that such inducements 
“stimulate demand for the manufacturer’s product,” thereby leading to increased profits brought 
on by the “positive effect of these services on demand.”72 
Resale price maintenance may also be used to provide incentives to retailers to stock and 
promote the manufacturer’s products.73  As noted by Professor Posner, the use of such price 
restraints works to “guarantee . . . [retailers] a profit greater than pure competition,” thus 
                                                 
 
67 ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 19, at §18.01[3].   
 
68 COMANOR, supra note 48, at 308. 
 
69 Id.   
 
70 ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 19, at §18.01[3]. 
 
71 See Shawn D. Parrish, LexisNexis Expert Commentaries, Parrish on Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, 
Inc. (citing Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 54) (on file with author). 
 
72 COMANOR, supra note 48, at 307 (noting Professor Lester Telser as one of the “first to offer a detailed account of 
how manufacturers benefit from resale price maintenance.”).  Id.   
 
73 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 56, at *19.  See also Victor Goldberg, The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing 
and the Economics of Retailing Services, 79 NW. U.L. REV. 736, 749 (1984) (arguing that vertical price restraints 
may be used to “enhance the value of continued future dealing with the manufacturer … [by] influenc[ing] the 
expected future earnings” that the retailer may receive thereby providing a reason for continued business 
collaboration).   
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ensuring loyalty and honesty by members within the distribution chain.74  Vertical price 
restraints may also help manufacturers ensure that retailers will carry and stock new products, by 
dangling a generous minimum profit margin in front of them as an incentive.75  Thus, new 
products which often “face difficulty in persuading store owners to allocate scarce shelf space 
and inventory capacity” may potentially have a greater chance of success with the use of vertical 
price restraints.76  From a competition standpoint, the practice induces “competent and 
aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of capital and labor as often required in the 
distribution of products unknown to the consumer.”77  
Besides arguing that vertical price restraints are an illogical solution to the free-rider 
problem, opponents of the practice also contend that price fixing can preclude intrabrand price 
competition.78  As noted by Professor Pitofsky, “minimum vertical price agreements [can 
generally] lead to higher, and usually uniform, resale prices . . . [and] completely eliminate price 
flexibility at the dealer level and may stabilize higher prices at the manufacturer level.”79  In 
other words, many critics argue that the practice leads to cartel behavior by dealers, who may 
“somehow coerce, or otherwise enlist, the manufacturer . . . to act as their agent in administering 
a cartel . . . by fixing a uniform retail price for his goods.”80  Other commentators have noted the 
“possibility that a reduction or elimination of intrabrand price competition has led to a 
                                                 
 
74 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 41, at 172.   
 




77 Parrish, supra note 71.   
 
78 ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 19, at §18.02. 
 
79 Pitofsky, supra note 53, at 1488. 
 
80 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 41, at 172.  See also GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 14, at 294. 
 15
stabilization of prices in the interbrand market, thereby facilitating interdependent pricing by 
competing manufacturers (cartelization).”81  A corollary problem is the potential that vertical 
price restraints will “lead to higher prices for consumers.”82  Whether vertical price restraints are 
actually used to facilitate cartel like behavior amongst parties in the manufacturing chain is a 
questionable proposition that has yet to be dispositively proven.83 
 
C.  Does Licensing of IP Rights Trigger Antitrust Liability? 
 
In a published series of guidelines, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission noted that for the most part, “the intellectual property laws and antitrust laws share 
the common purpose of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare.”84  However, it 
is not to say that the exploitation of one’s intellectual property can never lead to antitrust 
liability.85  Antitrust concerns may be prompted in situations where businesses license their 
intellectual property rights to another company for exploitation, or where the businesses combine 
                                                 
 
81 ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 19, at §18.02 (noting that such facilitation may lead to cartelization in that 
particular market, with the resulting resale price fixing functioning as a “means to police the participants and to 
prevent ‘cheating’”). 
 
82 Harbour, supra note 34, at 45.   
 
83 COMANOR, supra note 48, at 307 (noting that studies have indicated that while it is possible that vertical price 
restraints are used to facilitate cartel behavior, the majority of instances studied indicate that it is not the primary 
reason for employing a price fixing scheme). 
 
84 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 1 (1995), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm 
[hereinafter DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST GUIDELINES].  The agencies noted that “[t]he aims and objectives of patent and 
antitrust laws may seem, at first glance, wholly at odd . . . [but] the two bodies of law are actually complementary, 
as both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and competition” (citing Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of 
America Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
 
85 See, e.g., JEANNE CLARK ET. AL., UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT POOLS: A SOLUTION 
TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS? 4-6 (2000), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp 
/opla/patentpool.pdf (summarizing the treatment of patent pooling agreements and whether such agreements violated 
antitrust laws).   
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their intellectual property in patent pooling arrangements.86  In many cases, a licensing company 
with greater leverage may impose upon the licensee restrictions as to the scope and use of the 
license.87  In situations where the restrictions are particularly demanding, the licensing 
agreement may be challenged as an illegal restraint on trade, thereby implicating antitrust laws.88 
                                                
As it specifically pertains to patents, the licensing of patent rights is seen as an 
arrangement promoting competition in the market, since it “encourages people to innovate.”89  
Licensing of patent rights often allows the patent holder to increase the efficiency of the 
production of the patented good, as it typically provides for increased productivity.90  
Furthermore, licensing practices are also favored “as methods of exploiting intellectual property 
which may benefit consumers by reducing costs and introducing new products.”91  Supporting 
the notion that licensing may be inherently pro competitive, federal agencies in charge of 
enforcing antitrust laws have stated that “[i]n the vast majority of cases, restraints in intellectual 
 
 
86 Id. at 4.  Clark’s article defines a patent pool as “the aggregation of intellectual property rights which are the 
subject of cross-licensing, whether they are transferred directly by patentee to licensee or through some medium, 
such as a joint venture, set up specifically to administer the patent pool” (quoting Joel I. Klein, An Address to the 
American Intellectual Property Association, on the Subject of Cross Licensing and Antitrust Law, May 2, 1997, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1118.htm). 
 
87 See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 193-94 (2d Cir. 2006) (detailing the terms of 
a license granted by the patent holder to a prospective manufacturer). 
 
88 See, e.g., Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912). 
 
89 Robert M. Buchanan, Jr. & Andrew W. Feinberg, The 1995 DOJ and FTC Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing 
of Intellectual Property, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: ANTITRUST/INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAIMS 
IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY MARKETS: LITIGATING AND ADVISING IN AN ERA OF UNCERTAINTY (1997) [hereinafter ALI-
ABA ANTITRUST COURSE].  See also DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 84, § 2.3 (“By potentially 
increasing the expected returns from intellectual property, licensing also can increase the incentive for its creation 
and thus promote greater investment in research and development. Sometimes the use of one item of intellectual 
property requires access to another. An item of intellectual property ‘blocks’ another when the second cannot be 
practiced without using the first. For example, an improvement on a patented machine can be blocked by the patent 
on the machine. Licensing may promote the coordinated development of technologies that are in a blocking 
relationship.”). 
 
90 DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 84, at § 2.3. 
 
91 Buchanan, supra note 89.  
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property licensing arrangements are evaluated under the rule of reason,” thus not falling into the 
category of practices which “always or almost always tend[] to restrict competition.”92   
Those who oppose the use of patent licensing argue that the practice invariably triggers 
concerns about patent misuse.93  Under the intellectual property clause in the United States 
Constitution, patent owners are provided with a limited monopoly on their inventions and 
discoveries.94  This monopoly right is not unlimited, as the patent owner must still nonetheless 
comport his conduct in exploiting his patent rights in a manner that does not violate antitrust 
principles.95 
As case law has delineated, there are often instances when licensing agreements result in 
antitrust liability.  For the most part, a patent owner may place price restraints on a licensee’s 
sales outside of a few limited exceptions.  These price restraints are often the result of the 
patentee’s desire for increased royalties, or for greater protection of the patentee’s “competitive 
position harmed or its profits reduced,” where the licensee would otherwise be able to sell the 
goods at prices below those of the patentee.96   
In Bement v. National Harrow Company, Justice Peckham on behalf of the majority 
noted that a patentee’s monopoly rights allow him to impose “any conditions which are not in 
                                                 
 
92 DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 84, at § 3.4.  See also Bus. Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 
723. 
 
93 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 50, at 240. 
 
94 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have Power … [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”).  See also 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000) (providing that the patent monopoly may be held for up to 
twenty years from the date the patent application was filed). 
 
95 See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (Noting that while public policy seeks to 
reward innovation with a patent, it also “forbids the use of the patent to secure an exclusive right or limited 
monopoly not granted by the Patent Office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant”).  Id. at 492. 
 
96 ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 19, at § 18.06[1]. 
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their very nature illegal with regard to . . . [agreements with] the licensee for the right to 
manufacturer or use or sell the article.” 97  Furthermore, the “fact that the conditions in the 
[licensing] contract keep up the monopoly or fix prices does not render them illegal.”98  In 
General Electric, the Court held that a patent owner who “manufactures and sells its patented 
product may establish the price at which a manufacturing licensee sells that product.”99  So long 
as price restraints “are normally and reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary reward for the 
patentee’s monopoly,” such restrictions are deemed corollary to the benefits normally awarded to 
the patent owner.100  However, despite the seemingly broad right granted to patentees as to price 
restraints on their licensee’s sales, courts have limited the General Electric holding to primarily 
those situations where the patentee is a manufacturer in competition with the licensee.101  The 
Court’s holding did nothing to disturb prior established limitations which prevented the patent 
owner from setting the “resale price of the patented merchandise once those goods have been 
sold.”102  The ability of manufacturing patent owners to impose price restraints on their licensees 
is also limited by procedural requirements, such as the presence of a valid patent.103 
                                                 
 
97 Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902).   
 
98 Id.   
 
99 General Electric, 272 U.S. at 488; ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 19, at § 18.06[1]. 
 
100 General Electric, 272 U.S. at 490. 
 
101 ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 19, at § 18.06[1].  See, e.g., United States v. New Wrinkle, 342 U.S. 371 (1952).  
The Court in New Wrinkle refused to apply the holding in General Electric to any situation where the patent holder 
did not personally manufacture the product which it imposed price restraints on its licensee.  Id. at 378.  Similarly in 
United States v. Line Material, 333 U.S. 287, 310 (1948), the Court reaffirmed the ability of a patentee to “validly 
license a competitor to make and vend with a price limitation under the General Electric case” (emphasis added).   
 
102 ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 19, at § 18.06[1].  In fact, the General Electric court reaffirmed this conclusion 
when it noted that “it is well settled … that where a patentee makes the patented article and sells it, he can exercise 
no future control over what the purchaser may wish to do with the article after his purchase.”  General Electric, 272 




 In United States v. United States Gypsum, licensing agreements as to U.S. Gypsum’s 
patents for an improved gypsum board and the associated manufacturing process were 
challenged as violating antitrust laws.104  These new gypsum boards were an improvement to the 
extent that they had closed edges, allowing for increase in quality, cheaper production costs, and 
increased durability compared to existing gypsum boards.105  Licensing arrangements containing 
resale price restraints were soon instituted, partly due to the pending expiration of the patent for 
the improved boards.106  The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s determination that the 
“common plan [between the parties in the licensing agreement] to organize the gypsum industry 
and stabilize prices through a network of patent licenses was legally permissible.”107  Noting that 
it was irrelevant whether the parties knew that they entered into a licensing agreement to control 
resale prices, the Court held that the patent licenses here were barred by the Sherman Act.108  
The Court invalidated the licensing scheme, holding that price restraints on licensee sales of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
103 Clearly, a prerequisite to allowing a patent owner to place price restraints on licensee’s sale of the patented goods 
is the presence of a valid patent.  For example, the court in Robert H. Ingersoll & Bro. v. McColl, 204 F. 147, 149 
(D. Minn. 1913) refused to allow a watch manufacturer from imposing price restraints where the restriction was not 
done for “the purpose of protecting the patent or for securing its benefits.”  There, the manufacturer’s license 
restrictions were not the result of a desire to protect his patent rights (since no patent had been granted), but an 
attempt to protect the company’s trademarks.  Id. at 151.  Similarly in Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 
329 U.S. 394, 398 (1947), the Court held that in a patent licensing scheme, “if the patent was invalid, the price-
fixing provision violated the federal anti-trust laws.”  Finally, any protections from antitrust laws the General 
Electric holding provides to the patent holder in its licensing agreements ends upon the expiration of the patent 
itself.  Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Products Co., 479 F.2d 269, 279 (8th Cir. 1973).   
 
104 333 U.S. 364, 369-72 (1948).   
 
105 Id. at 370.   
 
106 Id. at 375-76. 
 
107 Id. at 392.   
 
108 Id. at 392-93.   
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product were valid only where “[t]he price relates to the patented product only, and to the entire 
product, not simply a part of it.”109 
 On the other hand, vertical price restraints involving licensing arrangements have been 
upheld where the “patentee establishes and enforces the price independently of the licensee.”110  
This was not the case in United States v. Krasnov, where a manufacturer of furniture slip covers 
entered into a number of unlawful cross-licensing arrangements with other competitors.111 After 
discussing the relevant standard as announced by the Supreme Court in General Electric, the 
court held that the licensing arrangement violated antitrust laws.112  Whereas General Electric 
was primarily concerned with the patent owner’s right to exploit their patent rights by placing 
price restrictions on a licensee, “the price arrangement [in Krasnov] was not executed in a 
manner so that its purpose can be said to have been the protection of the patentee's 
monopoly.”113  Instead, the arrangement sought to benefit both the patent owner and licensee 
equally, as both would take active measures to ensure that retailers were not selling the patented 
goods at below the set retail price.114  Both parties “had an interest in maintaining a set retail 
                                                 
 
109 Id. at 398-99; ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 19, at § 18.06[1].  The Court in U.S. Gypsum noted that the trial 
court erred in finding that the “provision prohibiting the reduction of price on unpatented products was designed to 
protect the price of patented board, and was not used to stabilize the price of unpatented materials… as clearly 
erroneous.”  U.S. Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 399. 
 
110 ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 19, at § 18.06[1].   
 
111 143 F. Supp. 184, 188-189 (E.D. Pa. 1956).  Among the more contentious clauses in the licensing agreement at 
issue was one dictating that the manufacturer “would not grant licenses to others under the… patent without [the 
licensee’s] consent” and one allowing the manufacturer to “to set the price to be maintained for slip covers 
manufactured under the… patent.”  Id. at 189.   
 




114 Id.  The court noted that the “[patent owner] complained to [the licensee] when one of the latter's customers 
failed to maintain the retail price… [leading the licensee to send] out a salesman to adjust the matter.”  Id.  Of 
course, the licensee “in like manner and with apparent equal right watched [the patent owner’s] customers.  Id.  
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price and they each took action towards that end.”115  Thus, joint agreements between the 
licensee and patent owner to set retail prices at a mutually advantageous level extend beyond th
allowable patent rights provided to the patent owner, and impa
e 
rt antitrust liability.116 
                                                
PART II 
 
A.  The Previous Standard – Dr. Miles and Establishing the Per Se Rule 
 
As commentators have noted, early Sherman Act jurisprudence ran the gamut from literal 
prohibition of any contract or conspiracy in restraint of trade, to a rule of reason allowing judges 
to make their own interpretations, to a per se standard and “defined categories of illegality.”117 
In Montague & Co. v. Lowry,118 an early case holding vertical price fixing as a per se 
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Court laid the groundwork for the analysis seen in 
Dr. Miles.119  There, the Supreme Court found an arrangement limiting the sale of tiles in San 
Francisco to only distributors who were members of a trade association to be an illegal “restraint 
of interstate trade or commerce” in violation of antitrust laws.120  Unlike in later decisions as 
discussed below, the Court did not find that the amount of commerce at issue or the fact that the 
price fixing was an integral part of an overall scheme would avoid the imposition of antitrust 
 
 
115 Id.   
 
116 ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 19, at § 18.06 n.3. 
 
117 FLYNN & PONSOLDT, supra note 17, at 272.   
 
118 193 U.S. 38 (1904).  
 
119  While the Supreme Court in Montague did not explicitly refer to the “attempted resale price maintenance 
 as ‘per se’ illegal,” commentators have noted that the conduct was nonetheless violative of antitrust laws.  William 
T. Goglia, Annotation, Supreme Court’s Views as to What Constitutes Per Se Illegal Price Fixing Under the 
Sherman Act, 64 L. ED. 2D 997, § 19(a) (2006). 
 
120 Montague, 193 U.S. at 46.   
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liability.121  Thus, any agreement between vertical parties to fix the prices of goods was treated 
akin to a per se violation.122 
 Seven years later, again without explicitly stating so, the Supreme Court in Dr. Miles 
reaffirmed earlier decisions that vertical minimum price maintenance was a per se violation of 
antitrust laws.123  There, a manufacturer of medicines established a system whereby contracted 
distributors were required to sell the potions at minimum delineated prices established by the 
manufacturer.124  The company forced its hundreds of distributors and thousands of retail 
partners to sign one of “two forms of restrictive agreements limiting trade” in its medicinal 
formulas.125  These agreements were quite specific and included clauses limiting the distribution 
and resale of its formulas, dictating the prices that they would be sold for and permitting the 
manufacturer to repossess the medicines upon cancellation of the contracts.126  One particular 
distributor refused to enter into any agreement with Dr. Miles, and instead sought to acquire the 
                                                 
 
121 Id.   The appellants in Montague argued that “the sale of unset tiles [was] so small … as to be a negligible 
quantity; that it [did] not amount to one per cent of the business of the dealers in tiles in that city.”  Id.  The court 
rejected this argument, noting that these price restrictions still had the effect of either increasing the amount of trade 
between member distributors or forcing non member distributors to go out of business; which in either case was an 
unlawful restraint of trade.  Id.   
 
122 Id. at 46, 48 (noting that the “agreement directly affected and restrained interstate commerce” in this case, 
contrary to provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act).  
 
123 See Goglia, supra note 119, at § 19(b).   
 
124 Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 394.  For example, as noted by the Sixth Circuit’s opinion, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John 
D. Park & Sons Co., 164. F. 803, 808 (6th Cir. 1908), agreements between Dr. Miles Medical Co. and its distributors 
specifically dictated that:  
It is agreed that the goods of [Dr. Miles Medical Co.] shall be sold by said consignee only 
to the said retail or wholesale agents of said proprietor, as per list furnished, at not less than the 
following prices, to-wit: 
Medicines, of which the retail price is $1.00; $8.00 per dozen.  
Medicines (if any), of which the retail price is 50 cents; $4.00 per dozen.  
Medicines, of which the retail price is 25 cents; $2.00 per dozen.  
 
125 Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 394. 
 
126 Id. at 394, 396. 
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medicines at lower prices by inducing contracted parties to violate their covenants.127  As a 
result, Dr. Miles sued for equitable relief under a theory of interference with contractual 
obligations.128  Thus, this cornerstone case of American antitrust jurisprudence began 
interestingly enough, as a complaint alleging a violation of a common business tort.129 
 In discussing the merits and legality of the agreements in Dr. Miles, the Supreme Court 
began by noting that the agreements Dr. Miles sought to enforce had the effect of “govern[ing] 
directly the entire trade in the medicines it manufactures, embracing interstate commerce as well 
as commerce within the state respectively.”130  The system employed by Dr. Miles in this case 
had the effect of destroying competition between retailers, since retailers could only acquire the 
company’s products upon agreeing to the strict sales and price requirements dictated by the 
manufacturer.131  The Court noted that consequently “all room for competition between retailers, 
who supply the public, [was] made impossible.”132   
 Nonetheless, in defense of its practices Dr. Miles asserted that its restrictive agreements 
were valid since “they relate to proprietary medicines manufactured under a secret process” and 
because “a manufacturer is entitled to control the prices on all sales of his own products.”133  In 
making its first argument, Dr. Miles analogized to the principle that patent holders may restrict 
                                                 
 
127 Id. at 394. 
 
128 Id. at 394 (stating specifically that “an actionable wrong is committed by one who maliciously interferes with a 
contract between two parties, and induces one of them to break that contract, to the injury of the other”). 
 
129 Id.   
 
130 Id. at 394.   
 
131 Id. at 400.   
 
132 Id. (noting that in the absence of any evidence indicating “any room at any point of the line for the usual play of 
competition between the dealers … a combination [in the distribution chain] to maintain prices and stifle 
competition has been brought about”). 
 
133 Id. at 400. 
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the resale price of their patented inventions,134 and sought to extend that principle to cover the 
secret process in this case.135  The Court rejected this argument, noting that Congress granted 
patent holders certain rights in exchange for public disclosure of the patented invention, 
including the “exclusive right to make, use, and sell the things discovered for a limited time.”136  
Here the Court noted that “there [were] no letters patent relating to the remedies in question,” 
such that Dr. Miles was not entitled to “secure the privileges [the Patent Act] confers.”137  While 
the agreements in this case would have been valid had Dr. Miles fulfilled the public disclosure 
requirements to receive a patent for the medicine, no analogous right exists to monopolize the 
product of a trade secret.138  A cause of action and subsequent appropriate remedy would have 
been possible under trade secret law since a “secret process may be the subject of confidential 
communication and of sale or license to use with restrictions as to territory and prices.”139  
However, because Dr. Miles sought to limit the sale and distribution of the end product, rather 
than restrict the use of the manufacturing process, the Court held that the injury alleged in the 
complaint could not be remedied in the manner desired.140  
                                                 
 
134 Dr. Miles Medical argued that Bement v. National Harrow Co. was controlling, where the Supreme Court 
allowed patent owners to impose “restraint[s] of interstate commerce which may arise from reasonable and legal 
conditions … [that restrict] the terms upon which the article may be used and the price to be demanded.”  Dr. Miles, 
220 U.S. at 401 (quoting Bement, 186 U.S. at 92).  See also Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992) (affirming the holding in Bement by allowing a patent holder to make restrictions on the sale of their 
goods as long as those restrictions do not violate antitrust laws). 
 
135 See Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 400-04. 
 
136 Id. at 402 (quoting Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 243 (1832).  The Patent Act grants a cause of action by a 
patent owner against anyone who “without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention.” 35 
U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). 
 
137 Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 402. 
 
138 Id. at 402-03.   
 




Alternatively, Dr. Miles argued that price restrictions on the sale of the medicinal 
formulas were allowed “by virtue of the fact that they relate to products of [their] own 
manufacture.”141  The Court also summarily rejected this contention, noting that while 
manufacturers may make the decision as to whether to sell their products, they may not “impose 
upon purchasers every sort of restriction . . . [and] a general restraint upon alienation is ordinarily 
invalid.”142  Furthermore, the Court held that even if restrictions on sales of Dr. Miles’ products 
were known to purchasers, in the absence of a contractual or statutory grant, such restrictions to 
fix prices for future sales were impermissible.143  Having found no authority supporting the 
expansive privilege Dr. Miles sought to exercise, the Court rejected the contention that the 
company had “the authority to control all future retail sales by a notice that such sales must be 
made at a fixed sum.”144   
Although Dr. Miles is ultimately best known as establishing a per se rule against vertical 
minimum price fixing,145 the Court's analysis implicitly acknowledged that the reasonableness of 
the alleged restraint was a major consideration as to whether such restraints were valid.146  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
140 Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 404 (emphasis added) (“[T]he maker of so-called proprietary medicines, unpatented, 
stands on no different footing from that of other manufacturers.”).   
 
141 Id. (noting that the “basis of the argument appears that, as the manufacturer may make and sell, or not, as he 
chooses, he may affix conditions as to the use of the article or as to the prices at which purchasers may dispose of 
it”). 
 
142 Id.  
 
143 Id.  
 
144 Id. at 405. 
 
145 Robert J. Larner, Vertical Price Restraints: Per se or Rule of Reason?, in ECONOMICS & ANTITRUST POLICY 123, 
138 n.2 (Robert J. Larner & James W. Meehan ed. 1989) (emphasis added) (noting that “[a]lthough the Supreme 
Court … did not explicitly hold that vertical price-fixing agreements are per se illegal, its reasoning clearly 





Adopting the rationale in an influential English decision, the Court noted that the public interest 
in free trade is the primary factor in determining the propriety of a restraint of trade.147  In the 
absence of a valid and overriding exception, price fixing for the sole purpose of interfering with 
the ability of others to engage in free trade, is void.148  In other words, the Dr. Miles opinion left 
open the possibility that a vertical price restraint could be valid where there is sufficient 
justification brought forth by “the special circumstances of a particular case.”149  While not a 
strong endorsement of the rule of reason, the Court suggests that simply creating a per se rule 
against price restraints in all cases was not the correct standard, and that some leeway should be 
given to judges in order to consider and balance the interests of the public with those of the 
manufacturer.150 
Such language cannot be disregarded as mere dicta.  The Supreme Court ultimately came 
to the conclusion, in effect, that the price restraint sought to be employed by Dr. Miles Medical 
was anti-competitive in nature without a valid justification.151  The Court rejected the 
procompetitive arguments advanced by the manufacturer as being insufficient to overcome the 
restraint's anti-competitive tendencies, particularly in light of the far reaching effects of the price 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
146 Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 406 (holding that “the public interest is still the first consideration,” and that restraints 
“must be found to be reasonable both with respect to the public and to the parties and that it is limited to what is 
fairly necessary”).   
 
147 Id.  
 
148 Id. (citing the general rule espoused by Lord McNaghten in Nordenfelt v. Maxim-Nordenfelt &Co., [1904] A.C. 
565 (H.L.), that “all interference with individual liberty of action in trading, and all restraints of trade of themselves, 
if there is nothing more, are contrary to public policy, and therefore void”).  
 
149 Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 406-407. 
 
150 Id. at 407.  In fact, the Court citing as an example for a valid exception to the general rule, focused on the 
reasonableness of the price restriction, “in reference to the interests of the parties concerned and … in reference to 
the interests of the public … [so that the restriction affords] adequate protection to the party in whose favor it is 
imposed while at the same time it is in no way injurious to the public.”  Id. 
 
151 Id. at 407-08. 
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restraint scheme employed.152  Consequently, the price fixing system involved in this particular 
case was invalidated as one which “create[d] a combination for [a] prohibited purpose,” with no 
reason existing to entitle Dr. Miles to any “special privilege or immunity” from the general 
rule.153  The judgment of the lower court was subsequently affirmed, holding that the specific 
pricing scheme in this case was invalid.154 
B.  Steady Affirmation of the Per Se Standard 
 
A number of major court decisions in the decades following Dr. Miles affirmed the 
holding that vertical minimum price fixing is a per se offense.155  In United States v. Socony 
Vacuum Oil,156 the United States government charged a number of gasoline production 
companies with violations of antitrust laws stemming from an alleged conspiracy to artificially 
raise and fix “tank car prices of gasoline in the spot markets in the East Texas and Mid-Continent 
                                                 
 
152 Id. at 408.  The stated benefit of standard retail pricing and avoidance of confusing different prices was deemed 
an insufficient justification for the price restriction system since the benefit of increased profits ran to the 
manufacturers only.  Id. at 407.  Thus the “asserted ulterior benefit to the [public] cannot be regarded as sufficient to 




154 Id. at 409.  In a dissent by Justice Holmes, he argued that court intervention in this area of public policy is not 
necessary but that a free market system would effectively counter any problems of price fixing.  Id. at 411 (The 
majority Court’s conclusion “is reached by extending a certain conception of public policy to a new sphere... the 
most enlightened judicial policy is to let people manage their own business in their own way, unless the ground for 
interference is very clear.”).  Advocating a laissez faire market economy, Holmes reasoned that the Court “greatly 
exaggerate[ed] the value and importance to the public of competition in the production or distribution of an article… 
[and] fixing a fair price.”  Id. at 412.  In other words, as people must make choices between purchasing what they 
want with what they need, as “soon as the price of something that [people] want goes above the point at which 
[they] are willing to give up other things to have that, [they will] cease to buy it and buy something else.”  Id.  
Especially with cases involving non essential goods such as the medicinal formulas here, the dissent asserted that the 
Court should not be concerned with price fixing unless such schemes involve necessities.  Id.  Rather a 
determination of whether a price restraint was fair would be best considered by the price at which the manufacturer 
will make the most profit, as that point marks the equilibrium of social desires and fair prices.  Id. 
 
155 See LARNER, supra note 145, at 138 nn.2-4 (citing Continental T.V., 433 U.S. 36; California Retail Liquor 
Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980); and Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 
752 (1984) as examples of explicit adaptation and reaffirmation of the per se standard).   
 
156 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
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field.”157   There, gasoline production companies entered into agreements with refineries in spot 
markets to purchase “large quantities of gasoline . . . at uniform, high, and at times progressively 
increased prices.”158  The indictment charged by the government alleged that these purchases 
“were in excess of the amounts which defendants would have purchased but for” the agreements 
at elevated prices.159  In turn, these practices led to artificially raised and fixed prices that were 
charged to retail gasoline dealers in the network.160 
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s determination that the arrangement in 
Socony-Vacuum Oil was a per se violation of antitrust laws, leading the Supreme Court to grant 
certiorari to review the case.161  On appeal, the Court affirmed that “price-fixing agreements are 
unlawful per se under the Sherman Act and that no showing of so-called competitive abuses or 
evils which those agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a 
defense.”162  Despite arguments to the contrary, the Court held that the government had 
sufficiently proven the presence of an illicit agreement between gasoline producers and their 
                                                 
 
157 Id. at 166. 
 
158 Id. at 167. 
 
159 Id. at 167-68. 
 
160 Id. at 168-69 (noting that the “defendants by raising and fixing the tank car prices of gasoline in these spot 
markets could and did increase the tank car prices and retail prices of gasoline sold”).  
 
161 See generally id. at 210-12.  The district court’s jury instruction as to the Sherman Act violations charged that 
“where the members of a combination had the power to raise prices and acted together for that purpose, the 
combination was illegal; and it was immaterial how reasonable or unreasonable those prices were or to what extent 
they had been affected by the combination.”  Id. at 210.  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court’s 
decision was in error, “since it was based upon the theory that such a combination was illegal per se.”  Id. at 211. 
 
162 Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 218.  The Court noted prior case law reaffirming the “well-established rule in clear 
and unequivocal terms,” that “agreements for price maintenance of articles moving in interstate commence are, 
without more, unreasonable restraints within the meaning of the Sherman Act because they eliminate competition.”  
Id. (citing Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 458 (1940)).  The Court further summarized its 
treatment of vertical price restraints later in the opinion, where it wrote that “[u]nder the Sherman Act a combination 
formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging or stabilizing the price of a 
commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.”  Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 223.   
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purchasing partners, and consequently that § 1 of the Sherman Act had been violated.163  The 
Court refused to entertain any argument that the price fixing scheme in this case was necessary to 
eliminate “so-called competitive evils” for fear of adopting a rule of reason test.164  Broadly 
ruling that “[a]ny combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful 
activity,” the court disregarded any extenuating circumstances or well intentions on the part of 
the proponent of the price fixing activity.165 
In a case factually similar to Dr. Miles decided nearly twenty years after Socony-Vacuum, 
the Supreme Court in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.166 again held that a resale price 
maintenance scheme between a drug manufacturer and its distributors was a per se violation of 
the Sherman Act.167  There, a drug manufacturer refused to supply its products to distributors 
that resold the goods at prices below the respective suggested minimum retail price.168  
Complaints regarding the resale price maintenance arrangement were lodged to the Department 
of Justice’s Antitrust Division, leading the United States to later sue for antitrust violations.169  In 
                                                 
 
163 Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 219-20.  The Court cited “abundant evidence that the combination had the purpose 
to raise prices … [and] ample evidence that the buying programs at least contributed to the price rise … of the spot 
markets, and to increases in the price of gasoline sold.”  Id. at 219.  Furthermore, the Court held that the fact that 
these agreements were designed to, and had the effect of, restricting competition through the decrease supply of 
gasoline in the area also indicated the presence of an illegal vertical restraint justifying per se treatment.  Id. at 219-
20.   
 
164 Id. at 220.  Specifically, the Supreme Court held that “[i]f the so-called competitive abuses were to be appraised 
here, the reasonableness of prices would necessarily become an issue in every price fixing case … [and] the 
Sherman Act would soon be emasculated.”  Id. at 221.   
 
165 Id. at 221 (“The [Sherman] Act places all such schemes beyond the pale and protects that vital part of our 
economy against any degree of interference. . . . Congress has not left with us the determination of whether or not 
particular price-fixing schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or destructive.”). 
 
166 362 U.S. 29 (1960). 
 
167 Id. at 47. 
 
168 See generally id. at 31-34. 
 
169 Id. at 30. 
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considering the merits of the United States’ request for an injunction against Parke, Davis’ 
practice, the district court held that the defendant’s actions fell into an exception to the per se 
rule against resale price restraints and was “properly unilateral and sanctioned by law.”170  On 
appeal, the Supreme Court held that the price maintenance provisions in Parke, Davis’ 
agreements exceeded the scope of the limited exception announced in United States v. 
Colgate.171  As a result, where the manufacturer does more than just announce a resale price 
restraint and refuse to deal with distributors who decline to abide by that policy, but rather 
actually uses that resale price restraint policy as a means of forcing compliance or risk loss of 
business relations, the latter course of action is not protected activity.172  Consequently, the Court 
held that the resale price restraint agreements with distributors here was an illegal “combination 
formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing 
the price of a commodity,” justifying a finding of per se illegality under Dr. Miles.173 
In Albrecht v. Herald Co., the Supreme Court reversed lower court decisions holding that 
vertical maximum price restraints were not per se violations of antitrust laws.174  There, a 
newspaper publisher entered into distribution agreements with independent carriers to sell 
newspapers at a “suggested retail price,” while also terminating such agreements where the 
                                                 
 
170 Id. at 36 (citing United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 164 F.Supp. 827, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1958)).  The district court 
based its holding on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), which 
carved out an exception to per se treatment of vertical price restraints to allow a manufacturer to selectively choose 
distributors based on whether those distributors agree to observe announced retail price maintenance.  Id.  See also 
infra notes 200-205 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion on the Supreme Court’s limited antitrust 
exception announced in Colgate.   
 
171 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. at 45. 
 
172 Id.  
 
173 Id. at 47 (citing Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 223). 
 
174 390 U.S. 145, 148-49, 154 (1968). 
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carriers sold in excess of the stated prices.175  The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
rejection of the carrier’s argument that the “combination to fix resale prices of newspapers was 
per se illegal under the Sherman Act.”176  Instead, the Eighth Circuit held that “the undisputed 
evidence failed to show a Sherman Act violation” since the publisher’s activity was wholly 
unilateral and not a restraint of trade sufficient to trigger antitrust liability.177  On appeal, the 
Supreme Court noted that “schemes to fix maximum prices . . . may severely intrude upon the 
ability of buyers to compete and survive in the market,” and are arrangements justifying a 
finding of “an illegal restraint of trade under §1 of the Sherman Act.”178  In doing so, the Court 
affirmed prior case law finding agreements to fix maximum prices “no less than those to fix 
minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby retrain their ability to sell in 
accordance with their own judgment.”179  Thus, per se treatment of vertical maximum price 
fixing was preserved and affirmed in light of the opinion in Albrecht.180 
                                                 
 
175 Id. at 147. 
 
176 Id. at 148.  The petitioner in Albrecht argued that under the Parke Davis line of cases, “any combination to fix 
resale prices . . . was per se illegal under the Sherman Act.”  Id.   
 
177 Id. at 148-49 (citing Albrecht v. Herald Co., 367 F.2d 517, 526 (8th Cir. 1966)). 
 
178 Id. at 152-53.   
 
179 Id. at 152 (citing Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951)).  The illegal arrangement in 
Kiefer-Stewart dealt with an analogous situation as Albrecht, where liquor companies “agreed or conspired to sell 
liquor only to those . . . wholesalers who would resell at prices fixed by” the producers.  Kiefer-Stewart, 340 U.S. at 
212.  Ultimately, the arrangement was found to be a per se violation of the antitrust laws, but it is unclear whether 
the Court arrived at this conclusion on the basis of categorizing the arrangement as horizontal or vertical in nature.  
See generally id. at 212-15.   
 
180 In a separate concurrence, Justice Douglas argues that the “fixing of prices for resale is conspicuously 
unreasonable, because of the great leverage that price has over the market.”  Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 154 (Douglas, J. 
concurring).  The concurrence further differentiates the practices in this case noting that while vertical price fixing 
was to be adjudged by a per se illegal standard, vertical territorial restrictions were to be judged by a rule of reason.  
Id. at 156.  As such, Justice Douglas cites to the Court’s decision in White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 
(1963), where an analysis of “the actual impact of [vertical territorial restraints] on competition” was required before 
any liability under antitrust laws.  Id.   
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In the years following Albrecht, the Supreme Court was generally consistent in its 
treatment of vertical price restraints and affirming the Dr. Miles per se standard.181  In Monsanto 
v. Spray Rite Service Corp., the Supreme Court reiterated that price fixing schemes between 
manufacturers and distributors are and “have been per se illegal since the early years of national 
antitrust enforcement.”182  In that case, a manufacturer of chemical products (Monsanto) 
terminated the distribution agreement of one of its wholesale retailers on the grounds that the 
retailer failed to have “trained salesmen and promote sales adequately.”183  The distributor 
responded by arguing that Monsanto’s distribution agreements184 amounted to an illegal restraint 
of trade subject to antitrust liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act.185  While the Court ultimately 
found no antitrust violation in Monsanto, it nonetheless affirmed the general premise that vertical 
price restraints were a per se violation.186  The Court’s opinion in Monsanto is additionally 
noteworthy for Justice Brennan’s concurrence noting the difficulties in overcoming stare decisis 
in antitrust cases, a problem also addressed in Leegin.187  Due to the absence of any 
                                                 
 
181 See, e.g., Monsanto, 465 U.S. 752; White Motor Co., 372 U.S. 253; United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 
U.S. 365 (1970).   
 
182 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761. 
 
183 Id. at 757.   
 
184 The District Court determined that Monsanto’s distribution plan was based on 1 year renewable terms with 
retailers, with renewal based on a number of set criteria.  Id. at 756.  Specifically, “whether the distributor’s primary 
activity was soliciting sales to retail dealers… whether the distributor employed trained salesmen capable of 
educating customers on the technical aspects of Monsanto’s herbicides . . . and whether the distributor could be 
expected to exploit filly the market in its geographical area of primary responsibility.”  Id.   
 
185 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 757.  The termination of Spray Rite’s distribution agreement did not preclude them from 
continuing to sell Monsanto’s products, as it was still able to procure a limited amount of herbicides from other 
distributors later in the season.   Id. at 756-58. 
 
186 Id. at 761.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court was asked to consider the evidentiary standards necessary to sustain a 
cause of action for violation of antitrust laws.  Id. at 759.  See also infra notes 231-37 and accompanying text for a 
more detailed discussion of the ramifications of the Court’s opinion in Monsanto. 
 
187 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 769 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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congressional action addressing the issues raised by Dr. Miles in modern antitrust law, Justice 
Brennan noted his apprehension in undertaking the dramatic step of overruling seventy three 
years of precedent.188 
In 1970, the United States government alleged that a bicycle manufacturer’s franchise 
sales plan amounted to both price fixing and an illegal restraint of trade in United States v. 
Arnold, Schwinn & Co.189  In that case, Schwinn contracted with specific retail outlets to sell 
their bicycles so long as the retailers abided by certain conditions.190  Retailers who did not sell 
bicycles according to Schwinn’s directives risked having their exclusive franchise agreements 
terminated.191  The government consequently instituted suit alleging that Schwinn violated 
antitrust laws when it terminated franchise agreements because retailers made “sales to 
unfranchised retailers or [in] violation of territorial limitations.”192  While the Supreme Court’s 
holding involved primarily a discussion of per se treatment of vertical non-price territorial 
restraints, the Court in dicta nonetheless affirmed the validity of per se treatment of vertical price 
fixing arrangements.193 
                                                 
 
188 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).   The concurrence specifically noted that because “Congress has never enacted 
legislation to overrule the [Dr. Miles] interpretation of the Sherman Act . . . [there is] no reason for us to depart from 
our longstanding interpretation of the Act.”  Id. 
 
189 388 U.S. 365, 367-70 (1967), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 
190 Id. at 370-71.  Among the conditions imposed on franchised retailers by Schwinn include: the requirement to 
“promote Schwinn bicycles and to give them at least equal prominence with competing brands;” to sell in only the 
“franchised . . . designated location or locations;” and the requirement “to purchase only from or through the 
distributor authorized to serve that particular area.”  Id. 
 
191 Id. at 371.   
 
192 Id. at 372. 
 
193 Id. at 373.   Because Schwinn did not appeal as to the district court’s finding that there was an unlawful price 
restraint, the Supreme Court declined to address whether the district court erred in making its conclusion.  Id. at 373.  
However, the Court did note that “if there were here a finding that the restrictions were part of a scheme involving 
unlawful price fixing, the result would be a per se violation of the Sherman Act.”  Id.  Furthermore, the failure by 
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In White Motor Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court reaffirmed explicitly that 
“[p]rice fixing arrangements, both vertical and horizontal, have . . . been held to be per se 
violations of the antitrust laws.194  There, White Motor contracted with dealers and distributors 
to sell trucks and truck parts to end users pursuant to licensing agreements that limited both th
price of the goods and the territory of the purchasers.
e 
                                                                                                                                                            
195  Interestingly, despite noting that vertical 
price restraint practices were per se violations of antitrust laws, the Court refused to find a 
violation in White Motor Co. on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence that the price 
fixing was integral to the business.196  The Court rejected as unconvincing assertions that vertical 
price restraints were necessary in order to give certain “classes of customers their proper 
discounts,” that they affected “only spare and repair parts and accessories” for these special 
customers, and that they were necessary to preserve the company’s future sales.197  Upon the 
finding that there was price fixing present, the Court held that any “restrictive practices ancillary 
to the price-fixing scheme [were] also quite properly restrained” without any inquiry as to the 
reasonableness of either the core price restraint or related activities.198   
 
the government to argue anything to the contrary other than per se treatment of the practice in this case led the Court 
to remand for further considerations as to the competitive effects of the price restriction.  Id. at 382. 
 
194 372 U.S. 253, 260 (1963) (citations omitted).   
 
195 Id. at 255, 257.  For example, White Motor Co. inserted territorial clauses in their agreements with dealers, which 
bound dealers and distributors to “develop the [particular] territory to the satisfaction of Company, and not to sell 
any trucks purchased hereunder except in accordance with this agreement . . . except to individuals, firms, or 
corporations having a place of business and/or purchasing headquarters in said territory.”  Id. at 255-56. 
 
196 Id. at 260-61.  Justice Douglas writing for the majority noted that there were clearly two types of price fixing 
schemes in White Motor Co. and that such agreements involved a relatively small amount of commerce.  Id. at 260.  
Nonetheless, despite holding that price fixing arrangements were per se illegal, the Court declined to impose liability 
absent “more detailed findings” of whether the arrangements were “an integral part of the whole distribution 
system.”  Id. at 260-61. 
 
197 Id. at 257-58.  The Court rejects the invitation to consider whether the price restraint was “an integral part of the 
whole distribution system” that would require per se antitrust violation treatment of ancillary activities. Id. at 260 
(quoting United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 720 (1944)). 
 
198 White Motor Co., 372 U.S. at 260.   
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C.  The Gradual Road Toward a New Standard 
 
Regardless of the breadth of case law affirming the use of per se treatment of vertical 
price restraints, the Supreme Court has not been wholly consistent during the ninety six year 
period that Dr. Miles was the law of the land.  Antitrust scholars have argued in favor of limiting 
the per se standard, noting that “support for the rule of Dr. Miles is slowly slipping away” as the 
“erosion of the [per se] rule goes on.”199 A number of cases after Dr. Miles slowly carved out 
exceptions and gradually broke down what had been uniform application of antitrust laws, 
culminating with the Court’s decision in Leegin.  For example, only eight years after the Dr. 
Miles decision, the Court in United States v. Colgate created a sizeable exception to per se 
invalidation of vertical price restraints.200  There, the United States government sued Colgate, 
alleging not an unlawful monopoly, but an unlawful combination with distributors preventing 
them from reselling Colgate’s products at less than fixed prices.201  The Court reiterated that the 
“purpose of the Sherman Act is to prohibit monopolies, contracts and combinations which 
probably would unduly interfere with the free exercise of . . . trade and commerce.”202  Thus, “in 
the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly,” the Court held that “the Act does 
not restrict the long recognized right of . . . [a manufacturer to] freely to exercise his own 
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal,” including announcing in advance 
any restrictions on such deals.203  As such, under Colgate manufacturers have a limited right to 
                                                 
 
199 Thomas E. Kauper, Vertical Restraints: Flynn, Ponsoldt, Comanor and the Sea of Doubt, in REVITALIZING 
ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY 318, 319 (Harry First et al. eds., 1991). 
 
200 Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307.   
 
201 See generally id. at 302-03. 
 
202 Id. at 307. 
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both dictate at what prices they want subsequent distributors to sell the items for, and to refuse to 
sell to distributors who do not agree to the restrictions.204  This limited right protects 
manufacturers from antitrust liability provided that such prescriptions are known at the 
establishment of the manufacturer-distributor relationship.205   
Legal scholars have further argued that modern antitrust law has moved toward “finding 
conduct per se lawful without regard for the values embodied in antitrust laws or for the facts of 
particular disputes.”206  Whether that conclusion has been truly realized is still a point of 
contention, but there is little dispute that the per se illegality standard for vertical restraints has 
seen a gradual breakdown in modern times.207  For example, the Supreme Court in Continental 
T.V. v. GTE Sylvania208 allowed for consideration of the “reason for the restraint and its effect in 
an idealized market of perfect competition” in determining the propriety of an antitrust action.209  
In that case, a television manufacturer sought to increase its market share by entering into 
agreements with individual franchise retailers.210  Sylvania “retained sole discretion to [dictate] 
the number of retailers in an area in light of the success or failure of existing retailers in 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
203 Id.   
 
204 Id. at 304-05 
 
205 Id.   
 
206 See FLYNN & PONSOLDT, supra note 17. 
 
207 See, e.g., GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 14, at 299 (listing a number of sources noting how “modern 
empirical studies and theoretical research have raised grave doubts about the wisdom of a rule that categorically 
forbids [price restraints]”). 
 
208 See generally Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).     
 
209 See FLYNN & PONSOLDT, supra note 17, at 273.  Professors Flynn and Ponsoldt argue that all the Supreme Court 
did in Continental T.V. was to “shift from one rigid and mechanical test to another,” thereby “preclude[ing] in both 
instances a full inquiry” as to that individualized case.  Thus, in lieu of bright line rules, the professors argue that 
courts should undergo a factual analysis of antitrust liability, looking to see whether “vertical price and nonprice 
restraints should be permitted or prohibited in all cases, or in some cases but not others.”  Id.   
 
210 Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 38. 
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developing their market.”211  Continental T.V. objected to Sylvania’s plans to add an additional 
retailer to their particular area, and also to Sylvania’s refusal to grant permission to open an 
additional retail outlet in a neighboring area.212  The franchise relationship further deteriorated, 
leading the parties to eventually sue.213  The trial court found that Sylvania’s licensing 
agreements violated § 1 of the Sherman Act since they had engaged “in a contract, combination 
or conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of the antitrust laws with respect to location 
restrictions alone.”214  After the Ninth Circuit reversed, the Supreme Court granted Continental 
T.V.’s writ of certiorari to decide whether vertical territorial restrictions should be determined 
under a rule of reason as opposed to a per se rule.215 
After discussing the prior per se standards in vertical restraints cases, the Court in 
Continental T.V. ultimately held that past judicial treatments were incorrect, and “that the 
appropriate decision is to return to the [prior] rule of reason that governed vertical 
restrictions.”216  Taking into account the broad spectrum of “scholarly and judicial authority” 




212 Id. at 39. 
 
213 Id. at 40.  Sylvania’s finance company, John P. Maguire & Co., Inc., sued Continental T.V., seeking money owed 
over credit extended to purchase merchandise from Sylvania.  Continental T.V. countersued both Sylvania and 
Maguire for antitrust law violations.  Id.   
 
214 Id. at 41.  
 
215 Id. at 41-42. 
 
216 Id. at 59.  A large portion of the Continental T.V. decision was spent discussing the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).  See generally id. at 42-47.  In Schwinn, the 
manufacturer limited distributors to supplying its bicycles to only those retailers in defined geographic areas, similar 
to the restrictions enforced by GTE Sylvania.  388 U.S. at 370-71.  Despite noting that resolution of the case 
required “an examination of ‘the specifics of the challenged practices and their impact upon the marketplace in order 
to make a judgment as to whether the restraint is or is not reasonable,’” the Schwinn court nonetheless articulated a 
“bright line per se rule of illegality for vertical restrictions.”  Id. at 374.  However, the application of this bright line 
rule was anything but clear; as the Schwinn court underwent a fractured analysis of the legality of the company’s 
business methods depending on how the activities were characterized.  Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 45.  Where the 
retailers acted as part of the vertical distribution chain of Schwinn’s products, such conduct was deemed to be 
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advocating the potential advantages of vertical price restraints, the Court articulated that the 
validity of such restraints should be upheld unless they can be “conclusively presumed to be 
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have 
caused or the business excuse for their use.”217  Explicitly overruling the per se standard in 
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., the Continental T.V. Court made “clear that departure 
from the rule of reason standard must be based on demonstrable economic effect rather than . . .  
formalistic line drawing.”218  In other words, the prior categorical treatment of all vertical 
restraints on trade as per se violations of antitrust laws was now held to be an improper 
application of § 1 of the Sherman Act.219  The Court acknowledged that the Schwinn decision 
had been the subject of tremendous criticism from both legal commentators and federal court 
judges, with both groups advocating, at a minimum, for a limitation of the holding of that 
case.220  In light of the criticism espoused by legal scholars, the Court affirmed that the rule of 
reason best comports with the intended means of applying §1 of the Sherman Act.221 
                                                                                                                                                             
governed by the per se illegal standard.  Id.  However, where the retailer’s conduct was more akin to a consignment 
or agent arrangement, the Court held that such restrictions were subject to the rule of reason.  Id.     
 
217 Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 57 (citing Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).  As 
Justice Powell writing for the majority noted in Continental T.V., this standard was later reiterated in the White 
Motor Co. case decided five years after Northern Pacific.  Id. 
 
218 Id. at 58-59.   
 
219 Id.  The Court does not preclude the possibility of per se treatment of some forms of vertical price fixing 
schemes, so long as there is sufficient economic justification for such a practice (“we do not foreclose the possibility 
that particular applications of vertical restrictions might justify per se prohibition . . .”).  Id. at 58.  Citing Standard 
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), the Court in Continental T.V. noted that “[s]ince the early years of this 
century a judicial gloss on [the language of § 1 of the Sherman Act] has established the ‘rule of reason’ as the 
prevailing standard of analysis.”  Id. at 49. 
 
220 Id. at 49 nn.13-14 (listing a number of law review articles criticizing the Schwinn holding and a number of 
federal court decisions making factual distinctions as a means of justifying “upholding territorial restrictions that 
would seem to fall within the scope of the Schwinn per se rule”).    
 
221 Id. at 59 (White J., concurring).  A concurrence written by Justice White argues that while the validity of the 
vertical restraint in this case should be judged by a rule of reason, he does not agree that it is necessary to overturn 
the Schwinn holding.  Id.  Instead, Justice White contends that because the practices in Continental T.V. indicate that 
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The decline of the per se treatment continued with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. where the doctrine was further limited to 
those vertical restraints of trade involving price only.222  In that case, Business Electronics 
acquired an exclusive distribution territory to sell Sharp’s products.223  While Sharp had a “list of 
suggested minimum retail prices,” its retailer agreements with Business Electronics did not 
require them to abide by the set prices.224  Eventually, the retail arrangement ended 
acrimoniously, leading Business Electronics to allege violations of antitrust laws in its suit 
against Sharp.225  On review, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding from Continental T.V., 
opposing per se treatment merely for line drawing purposes.226  Instead, the Court noted that the 
presence of a “presumption in favor of a rule of reason standard,” where any “departure from 
that standard must be justified by desirable economic effect. . . .”227  Thus, a vertical non-price 
restraint in the absence of any evidence to fix prices between the parties would not be governed 
by the per se standard.228  The Court opined that such non-price restraints may potentially be 
procompetitive and should encouraged rather than wantonly barred by per se illegality 
                                                                                                                                                             
there is less potential for both vertical and horizontal restraints on trade, and instead the possibility of stimulating 
greater competition among brands, allows for distinguishing between the two cases.  Id.  Thus, the presence of both 
“interbrand competition” among manufacturers and the “potential benefits of vertical restraints in promoting 
interbrand competition” provide two considerations that the majority used to as sufficient justification for overruling 
Schwinn.  Id. at 65. 
 
222 485 U.S. 717, 735-36 (1988). 
 






226 Id. at 724 (citing Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 58-59). 
 
227 Id. at 726. 
 
228 Id. at 726-27. 
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treatment.229  Consequently, because “a vertical restraint is not illegal per se unless it includes 
some agreement on price or price levels,” the Court in Business Electronics carved a further 
exception to the previously rigid and established standards.230 
As discussed above, while the Supreme Court in Monsanto affirmed the per se standard, 
it also provided parties accused of antitrust violations an avenue to escape liability, thereby 
weakening the previously near insurmountable standard.231  The Court was asked to resolve a 
split among the various Circuit Courts of Appeal as to the necessary evidentiary showing by a 
plaintiff to establish the presence of a conspiracy to set resale prices, and therefore survive a 
defendant’s directed verdict motion.232  The Seventh Circuit in reviewing Monsanto’s district 
court case held that a plaintiff simply needed to show “that a manufacturer terminated a price-
cutting distributor in response to or following complaints by other distributors.”233  In resolving 
the dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, and held that the dangers of an 
overbroad per se standard cannot justify a weak showing of evidence to find antitrust liability.234  
Where price fixing is alleged, “the antitrust plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to carry its 
burden of proving” the presence of an agreement to fix prices.235  Consequently, in light of 
                                                 
229 Id. at 731. 
 
230 Id. at 735-36 (emphasis in original). 
 
231 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 758, 768. 
 
232 Id. at 759.  Specifically, the Supreme Court’s opinion cited decisions from the Third Circuit (Sweeney & Sons, 
Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 110-11 (3d Cir. 1980)); Second Circuit (Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of Am., 677 
F.2d 946, 952-53 (2d Cir. 1982)); Sixth Circuit (Davis-Watkins Co. v. Serv. Merch., 686 F.2d 1190, 1199 (6th Cir. 
1982)); and Tenth Circuit (Blankenship v. Herzfeld, 662 F.2d 840, 845 (10th Cir. 1981)) as all being in direct 
conflict with the evidentiary standard announced by the Seventh Circuit.  Id. at n.5. 
 
233 Id. at 759.     
     
234 Id. at 763.  Specifically, the Court notes that to otherwise permit and inference of an agreement to price fix 
between a manufacturer and a distributor based solely “from the existence of complaints, or even from the fact that 
[the termination of the distribution arrangement] came about in response to complaints, could deter or penalize 
legitimate conduct.”  Id.   
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Monsanto, the ability of a plaintiff to rely on per se treatment of vertical price restraints depends 
on that plaintiff being able to allege more than arguably anticompetitive behavior in order to 
meet the heightened threshold evidentiary requirements.236  Where the plaintiff is unable to 
provide “direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the manufacturer 
and others had a conscious commitment” to the price fixing scheme, no antitrust action may be 
sustained.237 
In the most recent major realignment of the rules governing vertical price restraints, the 
Court in State Oil v. Khan overruled nearly thirty years of judicial precedents when it held that 
its previous decision in Albrecht v. Herald Co. was erroneously decided.238  Under Khan, the 
Supreme Court reversed prior per se treatment of vertical maximum price restraints, and 
advocated adjudicating such price fixing regimes under the rule of reason.239  In that case, the 
plaintiff Khan sued an oil company for antitrust violations stemming from an agreement between 
the parties to sell gasoline at a set price determined by State Oil.240  On review, the Court cited 
changed circumstances as the primary rationale for overruling Albrecht, commenting that “the 
pro-competitive potential of vertical maximum price restraint is more evident . . . than it was 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
235 Id.   
 
236 Id. at 764.  While not completely irrelevant, the Court comments that complaints may have probative value if 
joined with “additional evidence sufficient to support a finding of an unlawful contract, combination or conspiracy” 
for Sherman Act liability.  Id. at 764 n.8.   
 
237 Id. at 768.   
 
238 Khan, 522 U.S. at 22.   
   
239 Id.   
 
240 Id. at 7-8.  Khan alleged in his complaint that the Sherman Act was violated since their agreement with State Oil 
barred them from altering the retail gas prices and forced them to return excess profits to the oil company for any 
increases in retail price.  Id.  The district court found no “per se violation of the Sherman Act because [the 
complained about activities] did not establish the sort of manifestly anticompetitive implications or pernicious effect 
on competition that would justify per se prohibition of State Oil’s conduct.”  Id. at 9.  On appeal to the Seventh 
Circuit, that decision was reversed.  Id.     
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when Albrecht was decided.”241  In light of the “considerable body of scholarship discussing the 
effects of vertical restraints,” along with newfound difficulties supporting contentions that 
“vertically-imposed maximum prices could harm consumers or competition to the extent 
necessary to justify per se invalidation,” the Court adopted the rule of reason for vertical 
maximum price restraints.242  After the Khan decision, the only remaining vestige of the Dr. 
Miles per se standard for vertical restraints applied to minimum price restraints; an area soon 




A.  The Leegin Decision – Establishing the Rule of Reason 
 
 Turning to the central decision of this article, the Supreme Court in Leegin Creative 
Leather Products v. PSKS once again addressed the issue of which standard to apply in dealing 
with vertical minimum price restraints.243  While the challenged practices in Leegin did not 
involve matters of intellectual property, the case’s holding will likely have significant 
ramifications for those who own or exercise intellectual property rights.  As previously 
discussed, licensing agreements between patent holders and licensees often implicate antitrust 
and vertical price maintenance concerns.  The underlying conclusion in Leegin will likely impact 
how future patent licensing agreements are structured. 
In Leegin, a manufacturer of leather goods sold its “Brighton” brand belts through a retail 
network of 5000 stores across the United States.244  The stores chosen to carry the goods were 
                                                 
 








primarily “independent, small boutiques and specialty stores” due to the manufacturer’s belief 
that “small retailers treat customers better, provide more services and make their shopping 
experience more satisfactory than do larger, often impersonal retailers.”245  Leegin also imposed 
a retail price plan policy that refused to allow any retailer to sell Leegin goods below a suggested 
set price.246  The manufacturer later discovered that respondent PSKS had been marking down 
goods below the set minimum price in order to compete with other nearby retailers, an action 
that violated their agreement with Leegin.247  After PSKS refused to reinstate and maintain the 
imposed price restraints, Leegin retaliated by refusing to supply their leather goods, leading to “a 
considerable negative impact on the store’s revenue from sales.”248  PSKS consequently sued 
Leegin, alleging antitrust violations among other claims.249 
The District Court, while acknowledging that the proposed testimony of Leegin’s 
antitrust expert presented compelling arguments for why vertical price restraints should be 
judged on a rule of reason standard, nonetheless decided to follow precedent and apply the per se 
standard.250  Noting that the rigidity of the per se rule makes consideration of the expert’s 
testimony irrelevant, the court consequently refused to allow the jury to hear testimony as to the 
                                                 
 
245 Id. at 2710-2711.   
 




248 Id.   
 
249 PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30414, at *2.  Specifically, PSKS 
alleged that Leegin “violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by agreeing with other dealers to fix the minimum retail 
prices of the Brighton product line.”  Id.  The additional various supplemental state law claims were later abandoned 
by PSKS at a pretrial conference leaving the antitrust dispute as the sole issue for adjudication by the court.  Id. at 
*2-3.   
 
250 See generally id. at *3-7.  The court acknowledged that while “the Supreme Court has moved away from the per 
se rule in other vertical contexts . . . vertical minimum price fixing agreements . . . remain per se unlawful.”  Id. at 
*6-7. 
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reasonableness of Leegin’s price fixing arrangement.251  Once Leegin’s retail pricing plan was 
deemed an impermissible violation of antitrust laws, the jury awarded PSKS damages of $1.2 
million dollars. 252  On appeal, Leegin argued that despite the precedent announced in Dr. Miles 
regarding vertical price fixing, the Supreme Court had not applied the per se treatment 
consistently.253  The Fifth Circuit rejected Leegin’s invitation to distinguish this case from prior 
precedents, noting that the Supreme Court did consistently apply the per se rule to vertical 
minimum price restraints, and only adopted a rule of reason approach to other kinds of vertical 
restraints.254  Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit also affirmed the district court's exclusion of the 
expert testimony, finding it to be irrelevant to the per se violation.255  Arguing that the “per se 
rule against resale price maintenance is the lone remaining vestige of an antiquated antitrust 
regime that cannot be reconciled with either recent antitrust decisions or economic theory,” 
Leegin sought review by the Supreme Court.256   
The Supreme Court “granted certiorari to determine whether vertical minimum resale 
price maintenance agreements should continue to be treated as per se unlawful” under the Dr. 
                                                 
 
251 Id. at *13-15; Michael C. Smith, Motion to Limit Expert Testimony Granted (but not so fast, say the Supremes...), 
EDTexweblog.com, http://mcsmith.blogs.com/eastern_district_of_texas/2007/08/motion-to-limit.html (last visited 
April 1, 2008).   
 
252 PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 6879, at *3 (5th Cir. 2006).  The court 
subsequently awarded PSKS treble damages and attorney fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000).  Id.   
 
253 Id. at *4. 
 
254 Id. at *4-5 (emphasis added).  The Fifth Circuit noted Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Monsanto, where he 
argued that continued observance of the per se rule was necessary in light of Congress’ long standing refusal to 
“enact legislation to overrule the interpretation of the Sherman Act in [the Dr. Miles] case.”  Id. at *6.   
 
255 Id. at *7-8.  The court cited a desire for judicial efficiency in applying the per se to avoid consideration of expert 
testimony, noting that such a standard “avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic 
investigation into the entire history of the industry involved.”  Id. at *8 (citing Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. 
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).   
 
256 Brief of Appellant, supra n. 56, at *9; Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712.   
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Miles standard.257  During oral arguments, the Justices pressed Leegin’s counsel as to whether 
there was a sufficient basis and justification for deviating from the history of per se treatment of 
vertical minimum price restraints.258  Questioning from the bench also focused on the potential 
negative effects to consumers posed by overturning ninety six years of judicial precedents.259  
Justice Breyer noted studies done by an economist showing that the absence of retail price 
maintenance saved American consumers considerably with the pharmaceutical and blue jean 
industries.260  In that economist’s view, “uniform enforcement of resale price maintenance . . . 
can impose massive anti-consumer benefits.”261  Chief Justice Roberts questioned whether 
consumers would be burdened if overruling Dr. Miles would disrupt “a whole industry of 
discount stores developed in reliance” on the per se standard.262 
After discussing the general standards and applicability of both rule of reason and per se 
treatment of price restraints, the Court focused on its nearly 100 year old rule in Dr. Miles.263  
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, noted 
                                                 
 
257 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712.   
 
258 See generally Transcript of Oral Argument at *1-25, Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 
2705 (March 26, 2007), 2007 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 22.  For example, Justice Breyer questioned whether the weight 
of current economics literature was a sufficient reason to adopt a rule of reason analysis, especially where there was 
incongruence in opinion among the cited economists.  Id. at *5-7.  Similarly, Justice Ginsburg noted whether the 
Court should give any weight to the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission’s 
opinion in favor of a rule of reason, where “it was not so long ago that the Department of Justice took a different 
view.”  Id. at *7.  Most poignantly, Justice Breyer asked the attorney for the United States as amicus curiae, “why 
should [the Court] overrule a case that’s 96 years old, in the absence of any . . . congressional indication that it’s a 
good idea, when it’s simply a question in a difficult area of people reaching a slightly different weight” on factors 
for or against resale price maintenance.  Id. at *16.   
 
259 Id.     
 
260 Id. at *6.  
 
261 Id.  (emphasis added).   
 
262 Id. at *9.   
 
263 See generally id. at 2712-14. 
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that “the Court’s more recent jurisprudence has rejected the rationales on which Dr. Miles was 
based.”264  Foreshadowing later analysis in the decision, Justice Kennedy warned of the folly of 
adhering to past precedents solely for the sake of stare decisis reasons, especially in light of 
changing circumstances that make the rationale underlying those decisions inapplicable in 
modern times.265  Noting that the “rule of reason is the accepted standard for testing whether a 
practice restrains trade” in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Court addressed whether 
the factors in this case justify the imposition of the per se standard.266 
 Citing the fact that “economics literature is replete with pro-competitive justifications for 
a manufacturer’s use of resale price maintenance,” the Court ultimately concluded that vertical 
price restraints should not be subject to per se treatment.267  After considering both the pro and 
anti-competitive effects of vertical price restraints, the majority held that “it cannot be stated 
with any degree of confidence that resale price maintenance ‘always or almost always tends to 
restrict competition and decrease output.’”268  The Court acknowledged that the propriety of 
vertical price maintenance agreements were subject to “the circumstances in which they are 
formed,” since both pro and anti-competitive effects were possible.269   
                                                 
 
264 Id. at 2714.  The Supreme Court criticized its own rationale in Dr. Miles, noting that its analysis there “relied on a 
treatise published in 1628,” whose applicability was more appropriate for restraints “associated with land, not 
chattels.”  Id.  As a result, J. Kennedy warned the Court to “be cautious about putting dispositive weight on 
doctrines from antiquity but of slight relevance.”  Id.   
 
265 Id.  (noting that “‘the state of the common law 400 or even 100 years ago is irrelevant to the issue before us: the 
effect of antitrust laws upon vertical distributional restraints in the American economy today’”) (citing Continental 
T.V., 433 U.S. at 53 n.21). 
 
266 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712, 2714.  As noted above, per se treatment of price restraints is reserved for those “that 
would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”  Business Electronics, 485 U.S. at 
723.  In other words, per se prohibition is reserved for those manifestly anticompetitive effects.  Continental T.V., 
433 U.S. at 50.   
   
267 See generally Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2714-20.   
 
268 Id. at 2717 (citing Business Electronics, 485 U.S. at 723).   
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The Leegin Court further rejected arguments by PSKS that the per se rule would be 
appropriate on judicial efficiency grounds.270  As to this argument, the majority held that any 
suggestion that “per se illegality [of vertical price restraints] is the rule rather than the exception . 
. . misinterprets our antitrust laws.”271  While per se treatment “may decrease administrative 
costs,” the Court asserted that such rules may have the counter effect of increasing “the total cost 
of the antitrust system by prohibiting pro competitive conduct the antitrust laws should 
encourage.”272  Noting prior decisions as to this matter, the proffered judicial efficiency 
arguments in favor of per se treatment were deemed by the Court to be insufficient to arise to the 
“manifestly anticompetitive” standard governing the imposition of per se rules.273 
 As for its justification for overturning ninety six years of precedent, the Court 
downplayed the role of stare decisis in questions implicating the Sherman Antitrust Act.274  
Historically, “the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common law statute,” not subject to the 
“general presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress.”275  Arguing that the 
“common law adapts to modern understanding and greater experience,” Justice Kennedy 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
269 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2717. 
 
270 See generally id. at 2718-2719. 
 




273 Id. (citing Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 49-50).   
 
274 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2720 (“Stare decisis is not as significant in this case . . . because the issue before [the Court] 
is the scope of the Sherman Act.”).   
.   
275 Commentators have long embraced the idea that “antitrust violations are a kind of “common law” offense, where 
judicial precedent,” and not Congressional statutory language or legislative intent, “defines the substance of the legal 
rules to be applied.”  HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 50, at 51-52.  Professor Hovenkamp 
argues that the Sherman Act was written with the intention of allowing antitrust jurisprudence to become “an 
ongoing, ever changing body of rules” and providing federal courts with the opportunity to “learn how businesses 
and markets work and formulate a set of rules that will make them work in socially efficient ways.”  Id.   
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contended that accordingly, the Sherman Act’s prohibition on restraints of trade must also be 
similarly changed in light of the modern economic environment.276  Citing as persuasive the 
volumes of economic literature suggesting that per se treatment of vertical price restraints is 
inappropriate, the changing viewpoint that vertical price maintenance can be promote 
competition, and the call for changing standards by federal antitrust enforcement agencies, the 
Court conceded that the argument for overruling Dr. Miles has merit.277   
 Furthermore, as discussed above, the number of cases chipping away at the previously 
bright line holding of Dr. Miles supported the conclusion that the Supreme Court may overrule 
their own “‘precedents when subsequent cases have undermined their doctrinal 
underpinnings.’”278  Noting how their decisions in Khan, GTE Sylvania, Business Electronics 
and Monsanto have indicated a “progress[ion] away from Dr. Miles’ strict approach . . . [and] the 
opinion’s rationales,” the Court emphasized its steady efforts to “temper, limit, or overrule once 
strict prohibitions on vertical restraints.”279  Additionally, the majority rejected PSKS’ 




                                                
280  Rather than codifying a “rule of per se illegality,” the Court found that Congres
 
 
276 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2720.  It has been argued that “federal courts [have] forged their own antitrust policy, taking 
advantage of the best applied economics of the day.” HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 50, at 
58 (noting that United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affirmed, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), 
effectively ushered in a new methodology of addressing the issue of whether common law analysis should govern 
interpretations of Sherman Act).  
 
277 Id. at 2721.   
 
278 Id. (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000)).  See also Lady Deborah’s v. VT Griffin 
Services, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95138, *16-17 (S.D. Ga. October 26, 2007).   
 
279 Id. 2721-22. 
 
280 Id. at 2723.  PSKS argues that the Consumer Goods Pricing Act, Pub. L. 94-145 (1975), worked to ratify the Dr. 
Miles rule.  Id. at 2723-24.  The Consumer Goods Pricing Act effectively repealed both the Miller-Tydings Fair 
Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 75-314 (1937) (superseded 1975) and the McGuire Act, Pub. L. No. 82-542 (1952) 
(superseded 1975); statutes which sought to make “vertical price restraints legal if authorized by a fair trade law 
enacted by a State.”  Id.   
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sought to rescind per se legality treatment of vertical price restraints and instead apply a rule of 
reason standard,281   
 The dissent written by Justice Breyer on behalf of Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg 
acknowledged that the bright line per se standard as it pertained to vertical price restraints may 
have been flawed, but the Court is ultimately obliged and bound to follow its own precedents.282  
Although Dr. Miles and its progeny produced “a century’s worth of similar cases, massive 
amounts of advice lawyers have provided their clients, and untold numbers of business decisions 
those clients have taken in reliance upon that advice,” the dissent contended that those “who 
wish . . . to change so well established a legal precedent bear a heavy burden of proof.”283  From 
the dissent’s viewpoint, the evidence proffered by Leegin simply did not amount to a significant 
enough of a justification to warrant “abandoning a well established antitrust rule.”284 
B.  Interpretation of Leegin and Predicted Future Effects for IP Licensing 
 
In the months following the Leegin decision, a number of courts have had the opportunity 
to apply the new standard to factual situations, thereby providing some insight into the practical 
                                                                                                                                                             
   
281 Id. at 2724. 
 
282 Id. at 2731 (Breyer, J. dissenting).  Justice Breyer notes that “the question before us is not what should be the 
rule, starting from scratch…but whether [they should] change a clear and simple price related antitrust rule that the 
courts have applied for nearly a century.”  Id.  The dissent seemingly ignores the flaw in their argument that stare 
decisis concerns are paramount in antitrust cases, in light of the contention that standards of evaluating antitrust law 
applicability “always have and probably always will shift as ideology, technology and the American economy 
changes.”  HOVENKAMP, supra note 50, at 52. See also William Page, Ideological Conflict and the Origins of 
Antitrust Policy, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1, 36 (1991) (noting that the use of common law terminology in the Sherman Act 
was an indication as to the expectation that future courts take into account the constantly shifting and evolving 
market conditions).   
   
283 Id.  (Breyer, J. dissenting).   
 
284 See generally id. at 2731-34.  The dissent argued that many of the arguments that the majority uses to justify 
overturning the decision were asserted unconvincingly when Congress deliberated whether to pass the Consumer 
Goods Pricing Act.  Id. at 2731.  Furthermore, the dissent contended that the numerous studies prepared by leading 
economists do not support the assertion that there has been a “major change in circumstances” necessary to overturn 
existing rules.  Id. at 2732. 
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effects, if any, of Leegin to an antitrust suit.  In Lotus Business Group v. Flying J.,285 the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin was asked to determine the legality of a state statute 
seeking to provide minimum markups.286  The plaintiff sought reconsideration of the district 
court’s decision to grant summary judgment for the defendant, arguing that in light of Leegin “a 
rule of reason determination is required prior to a finding of whether a vertical price restraint is a 
violation” of antitrust laws.287  The Lotus court held that the new standard would not change 
their decision as to the legality of the state’s minimum markup provisions, due to fact that the 
original district court’s decision invalidating the state law was not based on per se liabi
Nonetheless hypothesizing the result under a rule of reason analysis, the judge in Lotus wrote 
that the result would not have changed since the evidence provided supported a finding that the 
statute was “virtually certain to reduce interbrand competition.”
lity.288  
                                                
289   
 
 
285 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86931 (E.D. Wis. November 27, 2007).   
   
286 Id. at *5-6.  In a prior court proceeding, the District Court found that the “Wisconsin minimum markup statute 
was inconsistent with the Sherman Act because the statute “fixes resale prices industry wide;” actions that would 
lead to a reduction in interbrand and intrabrand competition.”  Id. 
 
287 Id. at *1-4. 
 
288 Id. at *5.  Interestingly, the court in Lotus argues that the statute was problematic since it sought to fix “resale 
prices industrywide” with such widespread fixation of prices deemed “virtually certain to reduce interbrand 
competition as well as intrabrand competition, because it prevents manufacturers and wholesalers from allowing or 
requiring retail price competition.”  Id. at *6.  Despite contending that their decision was not based on the per se 
standard, the court’s justification echoes a commonly espoused reason for applying a per se rule (noting that “per se 
rules is confined to restraints… that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition.”).  Id. at *5 
(quoting Business Electronics, 485 U.S. at 723).   
   
289 Id. at *12.  The plaintiffs provided an economic study concluding that “sales below costs laws” lead to average 
lower prices thereby benefiting competition, in support of its cause of action.  Id. at *7-8.  On the other hand, the 
defendants provided a detailed report from the Federal Trade Commission criticizing the statute as “likely 
restrict[ing] competition and lead[ing] to higher prices for consumers.”  Id. at *8.  The report also concluded that the 
state statute “protected competitors rather than competition, and contained provisions that directly contravened 
established antitrust doctrine.”  Id. at *9.  In light of the evidence provided by the parties, even under the more 
lenient rule of reason, the court finds a violation of antitrust laws.  Id. at *12.   
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In the context of intellectual property, a decision by the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York is illustrative of the analysis courts may undertake post-Leegin.290  In 
Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, the major record labels sued the makers and distributors 
of software facilitating the peer to peer transfer of digital music files for copyright 
infringement.291  The defendant Lime Group counterclaimed that the major record labels were 
engaged in an unlawful conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of antitrust laws.292  Among the 
complaints explicitly asserted by the defendants was that the record label sought to monopolize 
the market for digital music tracks by “conspir[ing] to delay and disrupt the entry and emergence 
of . . . alternative means [of] distribution. . . .”293  In addition to being the sole provider of 
licenses to allow distribution of digital tracks, the record labels also provided for “dead end 
licenses,” which are “one time licenses to retrieve a digital file from a server.”294   
Ultimately, the District Court concluded that Lime Group could not sustain its cause of 
action for violation of antitrust laws due to its lack of standing.295  Despite allegations that the 
                                                 
 
290 See generally Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88449 (S.D.N.Y. December 3, 
2007). 
 
291 Id. at *1, *5.  Lime Wire, the software at issue in this case, is the most recent in a line of programs such as 
Napster, Kaaza and Grokster, which allow users to search and download music files.  Like with the case of Grokster, 
Lime Wire also does not employ the use of a centralized server, but instead allows individual users to connect and 
download directly from other online users.  Id. at *5.   
  
292 Id. at *1-2.  In summary, the defendants argued that the record labels have “engaged in an integrated conspiracy 
to foreclose competitors and monopolize the market for the digital distribution of copyrighted music over the 
internet.”  Id. at *14. 
 
293 Id. at *6.  Due to the huge resources the music industry requires to exploit artist recordings, very few entities 
other than the major labels are able to record, manufacture, and distribute albums.  Id. at *3-4.  With the advent of 
the internet and digital media formats, the costs of music production became affordable to the individual artists.  Id. 
at *4.  In an effort to maintain their exclusive stronghold on the music distribution process, the major labels created 
their own websites to allow for digital distribution, thereby forcing all interested parties to seek a license through 
them for access.  Id. at *7. 
    




record labels engaged in an illegal conspiracy to fix prices for music licenses, the court held that 
the absence of any real antitrust injury to Lime Group barred the action from proceeding.296  The 
judge in Arista acknowledged that under the more relaxed rule of reason the record label’s 
vertical price fixing schemes could have be unlawful, yet refused to find any violation of 
antitrust law in this case despite the more lenient treatment.297  Without adequate proof that the 
plaintiffs suffered an injury in fact due to the challenged agreements, the court held that the 
antitrust laws could provide little other recourse or remedy.298 
A similar result was seen in Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic International,299 where 
manufacturers of “visco-elastic memory foam” mattresses entered into agreements with 
distributors to sell the mattresses at minimum resale prices.300  The plaintiffs sued alleging that 
the price charged by the manufacturer was artificially inflated as a result of the various 
agreements and lack of retail price competition set forth by vertical price restraints.301  While 
acknowledging that Leegin “changed the standard for deciding a minimum resale price claim,” 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
295 Id. at *41-42.  The District Court noted that Lime Group failed to adequately allege “an adverse effect on 
competition marketwide,” or any specific “cognizable harm” to them.  Id. at *42. 
  
296 Id. at *24-25.   
 
297 Id. at *25-26. 
 
298 Id. at *26.  Lime Group’s failure to seek and obtain licenses from the record labels led the District Court to 
categorize them as prospective intrabrand competitors only.  Id. at *27.  Even if it sought to assert a claim on behalf 
of other intrabrand competitors who had suffered harm, Lime Group inability to “claim that it suffered any actual 
injury, much less that it suffered the kind of direct, non speculative injury that would make it an ‘efficient enforcer’ 
to remedy such a scheme” proved to be fatal in its case.  Id. at *27-28 (citing Paycom Billing Servs. v. Mastercard 
International, 467 F.3d 283, 290 (2d Cir. 2006)).  See also Port Dock & Stone Corp. v. Oldcastle Northeast, Inc., 
507 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 2007). 
  
299 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91241 (N.D. Ga. December 11, 2007). 
   
300 Id. at *2-3.   
 
301 Id. at *3. 
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the court noted that it “did not change the standard for pleading a rule of reason violation.”302  As 
such, a plaintiff alleging a private antitrust violation could potentially recover only if they could 
successfully prove “actual harm to competition” or “potential for genuine adverse effects on 
competition.303  In considering the facts at hand, the court determined that the plaintiffs did not 
meet the evidentiary standard necessary to sustain an antitrust violation cause of action, and so 
the case was dismissed.304 
Future treatment and analysis of vertical price restraints under § 1 of the Sherman Act 
may be seen in Lady Deborah’s, Inc. v. VT Griffin Services.305  There, the District Court for the 
Southern District of Georgia analyzed whether a contractor’s subcontracting of construction 
work was done in a manner that violated antitrust laws.306  After reiterating the rule of reason 
standard announced by Leegin for all vertical restraints, the court addressed the plaintiff’s claim 
that there was an illegal conspiracy to restrain trade.307  In addition to dismissing the plaintiff’s 
claim under the Colgate/Monsanto line of cases, the court further held that that the plaintiff also 
                                                 
 
302 Id. at *7. 
 
303 Id. at *8.  The District Court cited the recent Supreme Court case of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 
(2007), which held that plaintiffs must “allege sufficient facts” that would show “’plausible grounds’ from which to 
infer an anti-trust violation.”  Id. at *7. 
   
304 Id. at *12-13. See also generally Port Dock & Stone Corp., 507 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 2007); Wellnx Life 
Sciences Inc. v. Iovate Health Scis. Research Inc., 516 F. Supp. 2d 270, 292-96 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (both cases barring 
the plaintiff from proceeding with an antitrust claim based on failure to prove adequate standing). 
 
305 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95138 (S.D. Ga. October 26, 2007).   
 
306 Id. at *2, *18.  In Lady Deborah’s, in response to government changes in the manner of awarding of prime 
contracting services to favor those contractors who “subcontracted work to socially and economically disadvantaged 
businesses,” a general contractor came up with a plan to subrogate the new restrictions by using disadvantaged 
subcontractor as a straw man for a preferred company.  Id. at *2-4.  In other words, the contractor would condition 
the award of a subcontract on that party’s agreement to further subcontract a substantial portion of the project to the 
preferred contractor.  Id. at *3.  After the disadvantaged subcontractor was terminated after attempting to assert its 
right’s under federal laws, they sued under a multitude of claims including antitrust laws.  Id. at *5-6. 
   
307 Id. at *15, *19. 
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failed to meet the threshold evidentiary burden necessary to sustain the cause of action.308  
Despite a more lenient standard where the plaintiff need not spell out every alleged fact 
necessary to establish a claim for antitrust law violations, the court in Lady Deborah’s 
nonetheless held that the failure to provide “factual allegations supporting its conclusory antitrust 
claims” barred any relief.309  As other courts have similarly held, failure by the plaintiff to 
“allege a viable claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act by [simply] making a bare assertion of a 
conspiracy to restraint trade” was insufficient to allow the judge to then consider competition 
concerns under the rule of reason.310  
Legal commentators have taken a number of stances regarding the potential effects of the 
Leegin decision.  For example, they note that businesses and manufacturers who have spent 
resources devising ways to legally impose vertical price restraints now face the prospect of 
increased revenues if they no longer need to invest in such programs.311  Consequently, 
observers argue that such resources may be funneled toward “research and development to the 
benefit of consumers, distributors and producers, thereby eliminating unnecessary deadweight 
                                                 
 
308 Id. at *17, *23.  Under Colgate and Monsanto, a party may “unilateral[ly] refuse to deal, which is not per se 
illegal under the Sherman Act.” Id. at *17 (citing Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307-08; Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 760-61).  
Thus, the defendant’s subsequent termination of the subcontracting arrangement with the plaintiff in this case was 
consequently characterized as conduct not violating antitrust policy as there was no “actual competitive injury to the 
marketplace in general.”  Id. at *18. 
 
309 Id. at *22.  In holding that the plaintiff did not sufficiently plead sufficient facts to sustain their cause of action, 
the court commented that even “an act of pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, without 
more, state a claim under federal antitrust laws.”  Id. (citing Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993)).   
 
310 Id.    
 
311 See generally The Supreme Court, 2006 Term: Leading Case: Federal Statutes and Regulations – Sherman Act – 
Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, 121 HARV. L. REV. 425, 432-34 (2007) [hereinafter 2006 Term: Leading 
Case].   For example, in an amicus brief filed by golf equipment manufacturer PING, the company details a number 
of measures implemented in order to circumvent the per se ban on vertical price restraints.  Id. (citing Brief of PING, 
Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 
(2007) (No. 06-480), 2006 U.S. Briefs 480).  Thus, by “holding that the legality of a [vertical price restraint] . . . 
should turn on its actual effects on competition, and not on whether the manufacturer engaged in [anticompetitive 
behavior], Leegin removed the need for these . . . compliance programs.”  Id. at 434.   
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losses.”312  With increased revenues available for research and design, they argue that 
manufacturers may focus on and spur innovation with new products developed for consumers.313
The editors of the Harvard Law Review further predict that the case will
   
 have a sizable 
effect o




                                                
n state legislatures since parties engaged in vertical price fixing will need to persuade 
individual states to adopt the lenient rule of reason announced by the Supreme Court.314  The 
Court’s holding in Leegin applies and changes solely federal antitrust law, as prior judicial 
decisions have held that “state antitrust laws are generally not preempted by their federal 
counterparts.”315  Those states containing antitrust laws mirroring the strict per se rule of Dr. 
Miles must be convinced that the rule of reason is superior.316   
Recent news reports indicate that Congress has also rece
by introducing new legislation intended to directly counter the Court’s decision in 
Leegin.317  Under the proposed Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act, the prior Dr. M





noting that federal antitrust laws will be preempted only if state laws interfere with Congressional 
irectives, and “state antitrust law[s] governing minimum RPM is consistent with . . . ‘deterring anticompetitive 
.  The editors of the Harvard Law Review further note that while many states have provisions directing 
state courts to construe the state’s antitrust laws in a manner consistent with the federal courts’ interpretation of the 
13, 2007).  The 




314 See id. at 430. 
 
315 Id. at 430 n.51 (
d
conduct and ensuring the compensation of victims of that conduct.’” California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 
(1989)).     
 
316 Id. at 430
“
federal laws,” some of these very same states also contain express provisions in the laws outlawing the use of the 
minimum price restraints.  Id.  While thirty seven states filed an amicus brief in the Leegin case asking the court to 
uphold the per se rule based on concerns of higher retail prices for consumers, the editors argue that there is a 
countervailing argument that “manufacturers were nonetheless able to achieve the procompetitive gains associated 
with controlling resale prices through second best alternatives to minimum RPM.”  Id. at 431-432. 
 
317 Proposed Legislation Would Overrule Leegin, 2-8 LexisNexis Antitrust Reporter 17 (November 
p
several years during the 1980s, Congress passed “appropriation bills . . . that specifically prohibited the DOJ from 
using any funds to advocate against Dr. Miles.”  Bauer, supra note 43, at 22-23 n.119.   
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minimum price below which manufacturer’s product or service cannot be sold violates the 
Sherman Act.”318  The bill authored by Senator Herb Kohl (D-WI), argues that the Supreme 
Court “incorrectly interpreted the Sherman Act and improperly disregarded 96 years of antitr
law precedent,” and thus seeks to address concerns by the Court as to the legislature’s failure to 





gacy on antitrust jurisprudence is a shift as to 
what co
ould 
319  To further the efficacy of banning vertical price restraints,
the proposed bill also seeks to insert a sentence into § 1 of the Sherman Act explicitly noting that 
“any contract, combination, conspiracy or agreement setting a minimum price below which a 
product or service cannot be sold by a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor” as a violation of the 
Act.320  As of this article’s writing, the proposed law has been referred to the Senate Committe
on the Judiciary, with no further action taken to date.321  Other commentators have noted that 
many states may follow Congress’ lead and attempt to pass legislation of their own codifying t
rule of Dr. Miles.322  Nonetheless, whether Senator Kohl’s bill will pass, let alone have any 
practical effect on the field, remains unclear.   
Practically, perhaps Leegin’s ultimate le
urts will focus on in analyzing the facts for a violation of antitrust law.  Whereas pre-
Leegin per se standards provided courts with clear cut rules that were favored for judicial 
efficiency reasons, changing to a more flexible and fact intensive rule of reason standard w
require a discussion and hearing as to the “circumstances, details, and logic of a [particular] 
                                                 
 
318 Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act, 110 S. 2261 § 2 (b)(2) (introduced October 30, 2007).  The bill was 
introduced by Senator Herb Kohl (D-WI) and co-sponsored by Senators Joseph Biden (D-DE) and Hilary Clinton 
(D-NY).  Id. at Preamble.   
 
319 Id. at § 2 (a)(5).  See also Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2720-21, 2724-25.   
 
320 Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act, supra note 318, at § 3 (a).   
 
321 2007 Bill Tracker S. 2261.   
 
322 Bauer, supra note 40, at 29.  
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restraint.”323  The relevant market and possible effects on competition must also be considered.  
Economic reasoning, not formalistic-line drawing, becomes the primary factor in a court’s 
analysis.324  The adoption of the rule of reason as the governing standard in vertical restraint 
cases will likely lead future court decisions to favor antitrust defendants, as recent economic 
literature liberally supports the use of such price restraints as a means to promote competition




le to prove the existence of an 
antitrus l 
t 
                                                
325  The Supreme Court’s decision in Twombly necessitating 
higher evidentiary burdens of proof to show the presence of an antitrust injury also creates 
additional requirements before allowing a plaintiff to proceed with an antitrust suit.326  As 
previously noted, courts have been quick to apply the Twombly holding in addition to Leegi
severely limit attempts to charge parties for antitrust suits.327   
As a result, individuals considering the use of vertical price restraints would be best 
served to take actions to ensure that a plaintiff would not be ab
t injury.  However, even if a plaintiff is able to meet that evidentiary burden, a vertica
price restraint may still nonetheless be upheld if there are sufficiently compelling reasons that 
would justify the restraint under the rule of reason.  This defendant-favored treatment is 
consistent with recent studies indicating a shift toward limiting plaintiff recovery under antitrus
 
 
323 Lady Deborah’s, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95138, at *16 (citing California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 
756, 790-81 (1999)).   
   
324 2006 Term: Leading Case, supra note 311, at 430. 
 




327 See, e.g., supra notes 305-310 and accompanying text. 
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laws.328  Per se treatment of vertical non-price restraints led to a “plaintiff’s picnic” and a 
“voluminous amount of meritless antitrust litigation.”329  In the wake of Continental T.V. 
adopting a rule of reason for vertical non-price restraints, plaintiffs have rarely won on ant
grounds in the few cited cases alleging an anticompetitive effect.
itrust 





                                                
330  Commentators predict that 
the Leegin opinion will likewise lead to similar results in the vertical price restraint regime 
making plaintiffs succeeding on antitrust claims less likely in the future.331 
In the field of patent licensing, parties conditioning resale price main
licensing agreements may particularly look forward to the seemingly relaxed antitrust 
enforcement standards.  Commentators have often argued that licensing of intellectual propert
is inherently pro-competitive since the combination of various patents “will increase the ability 
of the economy to make use of an idea.”332  The exploitation of intellectual property by 
“licensing, cross-licensing, and other technology transfers” seeks to “benefit consumers 
reducing costs and helping to introduce new products.”333  Consequently, a party engaging i
patent licensing is provided an innate pro-competitive justification for any vertical price restraint 
scheme that under the rule of reason, would most likely suffice to avoid antitrust liability.  If a 
patent licensing scheme “as a whole promotes competition, then the license may include 
 
 
328 2006 Term: Leading Case, supra note 311, at 434.   
   
329 Id. (quoting Douglas Ginsburg & Leah Brannon, Determinations of Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United 
States, 1 COMPETITION POLICY INTERNATIONAL 29, 37-39 (2005) [hereinafter Ginsburg & Brannon]).   
 
330 Id.     
 
331 2006 Term: Leading Case, supra note 311, at 434-35.  
 





restrictions that limit the scope of the license,” such as a price restraint.334  In essence, in light of 
Leegin, not only is plaintiff success on a private antitrust suit increasingly difficult and unlikely, 
but there is also a high probability that government enforcement agencies will not prosecute for 
Sherman Act violations.  To further elaborate, despite being a per se violation of the Sherman 
Act for decades, the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division filed only a single complaint for 
a vertical price restraint in the period between 1974-1993.335  On the contrary, criminal 
complaints alleging horizontal price restraints numbered over one thousand during the same 
period of time.336  The near absence of any case filings provide some insight as to whether 
vertical price restraints are as anticompetitive a practice as asserted by proponents of the per se 
standard.  As argued by observers, it is likely that the DOJ “presumably would have mounted a 
far more aggressive effort to fine or imprison vertical price fixers” if the practice were as 
destructive to competition as alleged.337  A single filing in nearly twenty years of antitrust law 
enforcement provides a persuasive basis for the argument that the use of vertical price restraints 
is not such an unreasonable restraint to justify categorical proscription.   It also indicates the 
propriety of a more flexible rule of reason standard.  As such, substantial deviation from the now 
accepted rule of reason will likely not arise in the near future barring a major undermining of the 
rationale underlying the court’s decision in Leegin.  As it pertains to licensing of intellectual 
                                                 
 
334 Id. at 82.  As commentators have remarked, guidelines promulgated by the Department of Justice note that as part 
of the rule of reason analysis, they will “not second-guess parties [in a patent licensing arrangement] by asking 
whether another licensing arrangement would have been even more pro-competitive than the one the parties 
adopted.”    Id. (citing DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 84, at § 4.2).   
 
335 See GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 14, at 299-300.  In 1974, the Sherman Act was amended such that 
violations would be classified as a felony rather than a misdemeanor.  Id. at 299.  See cf. Harbour, supra note 34, at 
34-35 (noting how the Supreme Court has “affirmed a judgment on the merits for a private antitrust plaintiff in a 
vertical price fixing case” only once in the past 23 years (emphasis added)). 
   
336 See GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 14, at 300. 
 
337 Id.   
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property rights, the use of vertical price restraints should be freely encouraged where such a 




As evidenced by the last century of antitrust jurisprudence, the fluid nature of this field 
indicates that the current standard of dealing with vertical price restraints may not necessarily 
stand the test of time.  Under the Supreme Court’s current reasoning in Leegin, the door remains 
open for future economists and judges to change their view as to the usefulness of vertical price 
maintenance schemes to promoting competition in the market.  In the meantime, in light of the 
advantages offered to an antitrust defendant with a rule of reason standard, the use of vertical 
price restraints may be advocated and employed by businesses and manufacturers with a fair 
degree of impunity.  Whether the Court will revisit this issue again in order to change the 
relevant standard back to a per se unlawfulness one, or to adopt a new standard as proposed by 
prominent antitrust scholars, remains to be seen. 
  
